Kansas Federal & State Affairs Committee
– Informational Hearing –

Date of Testimony: February 1, 2022

Topic Title: *Election Integrity – An analysis of Election Officials' communications.*

Disposition: Proponent for Paper Ballot Systems

Testimony Type: ORAL in-person Testimony or WRITTEN-ONLY Testimony

Name: Robert Strathman

Cell: 785-285-1598

Rob.Strathman@protonmail.com

Representing: Myself

Election Integrity –
An Analysis of Election Officials' Communications

KORA Records Request: E-mail and Text Communications

From: KS SOS, JOCO Elections Commissioner, & ES&S

Date Range: January 2020 to November 2020

December 21, 2021

SENT BY MAIL

Shara Collins
6728 W 109th St Condo B
Overland Park, KS 66211

Re: Open Records Request

Ms Collins:

This is the production responding to your open records request received by our office on December 9, 2021. You requested:

All communication between the following parties: Sec of State Schwab, Fred Sherman, Connie Schmidt, Kansas Secretary of State, Ed Eilert, Elections Systems & Service, Jerome Lavoto, Steve Pearson, Kevin Rayburn

between January 1, 2020 through November 30, 2020.

The enclosed records are divided into three piles (1) Secretary Schwab texts; (2) communications to and from Connie Schmidt and others at Johnson County Elections; (3) communications to and from Elections Systems & Service and individuals at other organizations. They are generally organized from November 2020 backwards to January 2020. We tried to de-duplicate as much as possible.

There were a few records that are exempt from open records requests under KSA 45-221(a):

- (a)(2), (25): Any attorney client or work product privileged records
- (a)(6): Personnel records of individual employees
- (a)(10): Criminal investigation records
- (a)(30): Personal information – we do not release individual voter registration forms or advance ballot applications as they contain personal information such as social security or drivers license numbers.

Respectfully,

Clayton Barker
General Counsel, Kansas Secretary of State

The 14 KORA Files Analyzed

- Fourteen communications files, listed below, were reviewed and key elements relating to election system security and election accuracy were included in the following slides.

- References to the source file can be found in the header of each slide.

- Two summary slides are included to highlight the most pertinent material related to election integrity.

1. KORA File: 20211223080824428.pdf, 91 pages, 09/10 - 11/24/2020, Text Messages & Email from Connie Schmidt
2. KORA File: 20211223080943689.pdf, 51 pages, 06/02 – 09/09/2020, Connie Schmidt
3. KORA File: 20211223081034342.pdf, 76 pages, 03/23 - 06/19/2020, Connie Schmidt
4. KORA File: 20211223081143828.pdf, 65 pages, 03/23 - 06/19/2020, Bryan Caskey
5. KORA File: 20211223081239239.pdf, 69 pages, 07/30 – 10/01/2020, Bryan Caskey
6. KORA File: 20211223081336815.pdf, 69 pages, 06/11 – 07/27/2020, Bryan Caskey
7. KORA File: 20211223081439003.pdf, 79 pages, 05/08 - 06/16/2020, Bryan Caskey
8. KORA File: 20211223081525057.pdf, 72 pages, 05/7 – 05/8/2020, Bryan Caskey – mostly a System Manual
9. KORA File: 20211223081608006.pdf, 67 pages, 05/7 – 05/8/2020 – a continuation of the above System Manual
10. KORA File: 20211223081657816.pdf, 64 pages, 04/21 - 05/05/2020 – a few emails from Bryan Caskey, more Manual
11. KORA File: 20211223081726636.pdf, 35 pages, 04/10 – 04/17/2020, Bryan Caskey
12. KORA File: 20211223081824991.pdf, 76 pages, 02/25 – 04/08/2020, Bryan Caskey
13. KORA File: 20211223081908792.pdf, 71 pages, 11/07/2019 – 02/20/2020, a Power Profile Manual
14. KORA File: 20211223082015496.pdf, 68 pages, 11/07/2019 – 02/27/2020, Bryan Caskey

Summary of Key Findings

1. Election System Security:

a. **Hundreds of new access portals were created to allow every county election official to work from home within the system.**

    i. <u>Slide 37</u>: March 20: The pandemic caused the election staff to work from home, requiring the capability to work within ELVIS, the ES&S Election Software, to be <u>accessed from home via the internet.</u>

    ii. **Slide17**: March 24: JOCO Election Employees Work From Home Solution – allows employees to communicate to ELVIS – the Election Voter Information System, via the internet, in order to process voter registrations and advance mail ballot applications. ELVIS is software made by ES&S.

b. **ELVIS <u>was unable to track the activity of certain users in the system.</u> <u>ES&S confirmed that they have a "defect".</u>**

    i. **Slide 32**: May 8 & June 3: Pre and Post ELVIS 14.5 Software upgrade; planning and software issues; inability to track user activity.

    ii. **Slide 28**: June 17: ES&S – <u>Undetected activity</u> by an employee in ELVIS when using her Token (a physical key to access the network).

    iii. **Slide 29**: June 22: Due to apparent security concerns with ELVIS, Bryan Caskey, Dir. Of Elections, asks for a phone call with Victor Williams, Sr. Vice Pres-Product Development of ES&S.

c. **The Director of Elections did not know, as of Sept. 17, 2020, 2 months prior to the general election, if the equipment they had purchased from ES&S contained "wireless modems". Furthermore, instead of verifying this through a third party validation of the system, which is the standard practice for the EAC (federal Election Assistance Commission), he asks ES&S. <u>This is like asking the "FOX" if he ate the chicken!</u>**

    i. <u>**Slide 26:**</u> Sept. 17: When asked about the presence of "wireless" modems, Angie Frison, ES&S RSM, "guarantees that 100% of Kansas Counties do not have wireless modems installed within **precinct and central count scanners** purchased from ES&S.

    ii. **Slides 18, 19, & 20**: May 21, 2020: The BOCC approved **ES&S DS200's for every polling place**"… in JOCO. The DS200 is a Scanner & Tabulator. The "Express Vote" mentioned is a "ballot marking device" reportedly used in Shawnee, Wyandotte, Sedgwick and Johnson Counties….

    iii. **Slide 42 & 43**: August 13, 2020: **POLITICO reported**, "Election commission orders top voting machine vendor to correct misleading claims." This report discusses the ES&S DS200 Tabulators specifically and calls out ES&S for deceiving its customers.   **Additionally, the author reported that the company, ES&S, had previously stated that 33,000 DS200 Tabulators with modems were sold to 11 states. Are any of those in Kansas?**

    iv. <u>**Slide 22:**</u> Oct. 1, 2020: **Pro V&V, a third party auditor**, concluded that although there was <u>1 discrepancy in the ExpressVote hardware/software</u> it had no impact on functionality. Note, this is only a partial audit of the system.

    v. <u>**Slide 23:**</u> Oct. 1, 2020: ES&S admits they <u>failed a validation test</u> of the ExpressVote Software/Hardware, but claim this had no impact on the performance of the machine and accuracy.

    vi. <u>**Slide 13**</u>: Oct. 16, 2020; This is a memo of <u>an internal **certification**</u> of the election system. Shouldn't there be an External Certification? This is a well crafted letter designed to make the public believe that essentially none of the equipment is ever connected to the internet.

    vii. **Slide 44:** April 2021: Dominion and ES&S Voting equipment used in the 2020 MI election were found to contain wireless modems.

Summary of Key Findings

1. Election System Security, continued:

d. **Does this third-party vendor have backdoor access to our election system?**

    i. <u>Slide 16</u>: July 1, 2020: This is a message to JOCO election staff to participate in **the Center for Internet Security's (CIS)** Election Systems Pilot Program. The JOCO staff were somewhat surprised about the directive to support **CIS, but never questioned its purpose. CIS i**s a global company and a non-government agency, **whom was granted some level of access to our Election Data Servers**.

    ii. <u>Slides 29 & 30:</u> July 3 & 4: **CIS** informed KS SOS & ES&S of potential **unauthorized OUTBOUND activity**. Victor of **ES&S** responds, saying that this is legitimate traffic from an internal monitoring systems. Why is it that ES&S responds to their alert of UNAUTHORIZED outbound activity, calling it "legitimate". Note that no one from the State Election System ever questions this potential issue that just happens to occur on a Federal Holiday when no one is expected to be watching? Seems like a case of the Fox guarding the hen house.

    iii. <u>Slide 25</u>: Oct. 16, 2020: CIS requested details of any additional IP addresses being used from KS Election Officials and ES&S employees. ES&S responds that they don't use any other IP addresses.   Again, why is ES&S responding to these security questions? Because KS election officials do not have control over the election system; they don't know the answers. **The KS SOS has given full control of our election process to third party companies. How can these be tolerated?** This is absurd.

e. <u>Election Data / Location of Servers</u> **-** When a power outage was reported at the data server location, two counties reported it immediately, as it interrupted their work.

    i. **Slide 27 & 28**: June 11 & 12: The **electronic election system data is housed on Data Servers located outside of the state and are owned by Teirpoint**. ES&S blamed <u>Teirpoint</u> for the outage in this message. Who monitors Teirpoint?

    v. **Slide 18**: April 1: Sedgwick Co purchased voting software from EasyVote. EasyVote's website, states their **data is stored in the AZURA Cloud**.

Summary of Key Findings

2. <u>Unequal Treatment of all Voters:</u>

a. **A bedrock of American democracy is equal protection under the law. In an election the government must provide for equal treatment of all voters. In 2020, KS did not.** This election was being custom designed on the fly; perhaps understandably so, due to the pandemic. New electronic voting systems were being purchased, drop boxes were being used, mail-in-ballots were being sent out in mass, billionaire money was thrown around; there was no consistency on how to address issues in a standard approach across all counties. **Here are some expamples:**

   i. **Slide 15:** Sept. 21, 2020: Re, Mail Ballot Cancellation Requests. Connie Schmidt, JO Co Election Commissioner states, " The quantity that we are dealing with <u>makes this very difficult to treat all voters the same</u>-which is my primary concern. I will not be able to guarantee that we can cancel every request for a mail ballot."

   ii. **Slide 14**: Oct. 8, 2020: Acceptance of the CTCL funding for $856,256 for JOCO and detail about how the money was designed to be spent. <u>These funds were not granted to every county equally. CTCL is a partisan organization that MUST not be allowed to gift money to control the outcome to their political favor. This enfranchised the urban areas and disenfranchised rural voters.</u>

c. <u>Multiple Ballots are sent to one voter:</u>

a. A third party, Center of Voter Information, voter registration organization, sent five ballots to a registered democrat, but only one ballot each to the two other registered Republicans living in the same home. **This case begs the question, why do we allow third parties to influence our sacred elections? Note, the DA was informed, but the Center of Voter Information never received a phone call for their part in this.**

   i. **Slide 10 & 11: Oct. 21-26, 2020:** Interesting case where a registered democrat reported that he received 5-five letters from the "Center of Voter Information" group. He decided to test the system, making up data on a request for a ballot. His registered Republican wife and son, only received one letter. He self-reported to JOCO after receiving a ballot that he falsified data as a test of the system. Because this story reached the news room of KCTV5, they decided to forward this case to the County DA for prosecution.

Summary of Key Findings

4. **The United States Postal Service mishandled ballots:**

    i. **Slide 40**: July 24: A **pallet of ballots** from SeaChange, a ballot printing company, were not processed through the USPS correctly; see slide 39 for details. According to their website, SeaChange can print ballots and program ES&S Voting and reporting systems; a one stop shop?

    ii. **Slide 10**: Nov. 2, 2020: A citizen reported suspicious USPS Activity. A Black SUV was spotted giving ballots to USPS drivers in a parking lot… USPS explained this was done with their knowledge. Because of Mail-in-Ballots, the postal service and all of their employees, becomes potential vectors to foul play.

5. **The "FINAL NUMBERS DID NOT BALANCE":**

    a. **When asked, the KS-SOS will tell you that the 2020 election was the most secure and reliable election in our history. Well then, Mr. Secretary, please explain how and why the final numbers do not match?**

        i.   **Slide 8**: Nov. 23 & 24, 2020**: This is a string of emails acknowledging that the final election numbers did not balance. The voter history by precinct from ELVIS did not match the votes counted in the vote tabulation software.**

        ii. **There was concern about how this might look to the public**.

        iii. Subsequent messages provide additional context; as they sought greater reporting capability from ES&S to allow for greater reporting functions to address invalid voters.

        iv. **Slide 9**: Nov. 12, 2020: Two extremely tight races; both within 0.5% of each other. This underscores the need for election system accuracy.

FW: New Release

Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>

Tue 11/24/2020 8:18 AM

To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>

📎 3 attachments (200 KB)
SELC-BIZHUB20112408000.pdf; SELC-BIZHUB20112408040.pdf; SELC-BIZHUB20112408130.pdf;

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Bryan,

This is probably something for future discussion – no hurry. My thoughts are that the voter history by precinct from Elvis should always match the votes counted in the vote tabulation software, by race, by precinct. We are receiving requests on a daily basis for data from Elvis by district, by precinct – and also from the vote tabulation software. When the numbers don't balance, it opens the door. Just my thoughts.

Connie

From: Phillips, Kathy, ELC <Kathy.Phillips@jocogov.org>
Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2020 8:07 AM
To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] (Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov) <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Cc: Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>; Sherman, Fred, ELC <Fred.Sherman@jocogov.org>
Subject: New Release

I have attached three pages referencing PPS-2019 (E11001) giving voting history to accepted, rejected and suspended statuses. Please let me know if you want me to look any further.

RE: Advance Voters - epulse

Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>

Mon 11/23/2020 8:01 AM

To: Phillips, Kathy, ELC <Kathy.Phillips@jocogov.org>; Hunt, Zach, ELC <Zach.Hunt@jocogov.org>
Cc: Hernandez, Elizabeth, ELC <Elizabeth.Hernandez@jocogov.org>; Sherman, Fred, ELC <Fred.Sherman@jocogov.org>; Burnett, Diane, ELC <Diane.Burnett@jocogov.org>

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

I would like an answer in writing from ES&S regarding how voter history is applied to voters in Elvis. This should be very straightforward – at least to me it seems that way. Why on earth would an undeliverable ballot issued to a voter be given voter history? Why would a suspended ballot issued to a voter be given voter history??

It is truly not the right answer to have to work these voters individually to "fix" an issue that should never have happened in the software. Please keep me posted.

Connie

_____

From: Phillips, Kathy, ELC <Kathy.Phillips@jocogov.org>
Sent: Friday, November 20, 2020 4:44 PM
To: Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>; Hunt, Zach, ELC <Zach.Hunt@jocogov.org>
Cc: Hernandez, Elizabeth, ELC <Elizabeth.Hernandez@jocogov.org>; Sherman, Fred, ELC <Fred.Sherman@jocogov.org>; Burnett, Diane, ELC <Diane.Burnett@jocogov.org>
Subject: RE: Advance Voters - epulse

Thank you, Diane.

After looking at voting history again today, I believe I know why the number of advance voters getting history in Elvis is so much higher than Electionware. It looks like the voter's whose ballots were flagged undeliverable under the Advance tab got voting history even if they didn't vote another ballot. Diane and I have looked up a few of these voters and rejected for undeliverable is the only reason we can see that they have voting history. If we want to fix the history for these voters, we would need to open each record to see if they voted another way and if not delete the voting history. Something to ponder this weekend.

Kathy Phillips
Assistant Election Commissioner / Johnson County, Kansas
2101 East Kansas City Road / Olathe, KS 66061

Above, Page 19:
- A post election acknowledgement that the final numbers from the voting software **did not balance. The voter history by precinct from ELVIS did not match the votes counted in the vote tabulation software.**
- **There was concern about how this might look to the public.**
- The following pages provide additional context; as they sought greater reporting capability and more functions to address invalid voters.

Above, Page 23:
Post election discrepancy: the number of Advance Voters in ELVIS do not match the number of voters in Electionware.

RE: Tie Race - State Rep or State Senate

Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>

Thu 11/12/2020 12:33 PM

To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Got it. Ties are determined at the State canvass for all state rep and state senate races.......we are good...

From: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2020 11:31 AM
To: Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>
Subject: Re: Tie Race - State Rep or State Senate

This message came from outside of Johnson County Government - please use caution when opening attachments or links.

State and national races are certified by the State Canvass, not the county.

Bryan

Sent from my iPhone

On Nov 12, 2020, at 11:30 AM, Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org> wrote:

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Bryan,

Who breaks the tie? Is it the County Board of Canvassers in a Johnson County "only" state race, or is it always the State Canvass Board for all state races????

We have close races, you know – and the provisional ballots could easily change everything one more time.....and the legal counsel is on red alert....

Connie Schmidt, CERA

Left, Pages 29 & 30:
- Acknowledgement of very tight races.

From: Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2020 7:16 AM
To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Subject: Update on 0.05% recount state law
Importance: High

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Bryan,

Mary Buhl asked me to reach out to you for any guidance on this state law. We have at least two State Representative races that currently fall in this category BEFORE counting eligible provisional ballots.

Many thanks!

Connie Schmidt, CERA
Election Commissioner
Johnson County Election Office
2101 East Kansas City Road Olathe, Kansas 66061
Direct 913-715-6807 | Fax 913-791-1753
Office 913-715-6800 | TDD 800-766-3777

Above, Page 32:
- Two extremely tight races; both within 0.5% of each other.

Fwd: USPS vehicles

Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>

Mon 11/2/2020 6:28 PM

To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Connie Schmidt , CERA
Election Commissioner
Johnson County, Kansas

From: Tyrrel, Debbie, ELC [mailto:Debbie.Tyrrel@jocogov.org]
Sent: Monday, November 2, 2020 3:45 PM
To: Gunn, Randy L - Liberty, MO <Randy.L.Gunn@usps.gov>; Hite, Randy - Kansas City, MO <randy.e.hite@usps.gov>
Cc: Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] USPS vehicles

CAUTION: This email originated from outside USPS. **STOP and CONSIDER** before responding, clicking on links, or opening attachments.

Randy G. and Randy H.:

A concerned voter reported to our office that there were multiple USPS vehicles in the parking lot between the Blue Moose restaurant and the old Macy's department store in Prairie Village, Kansas, "after lunch" exchanging containers of mail with a black SUV. None of the USPS vehicles that the voter could see had license plates. The voter questioned the driver of the black SUV who said he was the supervisor and they were delivering the mail.

Can either of you confirm that this is proper USPS processing of the US Mail including voted ballots in Prairie Village, please? The voter said that he has photos and video that he can send if you wish to see it or if you have an email address where you would like to have them sent.

Thank you for looking into this oddity for the voter and our office.

Debbie Tyrrel, CERA
Deputy Election Commissioner
Johnson County Election Office
2101 East Kansas City Road Olathe, Kansas 66061
Direct 913-715-6827 | Fax 913-791-1753
Office 913-715-6800 | TDD 800-766-3777

From: "Gunn, Randy L - Liberty, MO" <Randy.L.Gunn@usps.gov>
Date: November 2, 2020 at 4:19:58 PM CST
To: "Tyrrel, Debbie, ELC" <Debbie.Tyrrel@jocogov.org>, "Hite, Randy - Kansas City, MO" <randy.e.hite@usps.gov>
Cc: "Schmidt, Connie, ELC" <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>
Subject: RE: USPS vehicles

This message came from outside of Johnson County Government - please use caution when opening attachments or links.

Hi, Debbie. I made inquiry with the District Marketing Manager. What you described is part of the Extraordinary Measures we have implemented to get all ballots home on time. We are having relay points for ballots found in processing, after carriers are out on street, to get those ballots to the carriers as well as collect ballots picked up. Does that help make sense of what they saw?

Randy L. Gunn
A/Mailing Standards Specialist, Mid-America District
Political and Election Mail Coordinator
1000 Progress Rd.
Liberty MO 64068-9998
816-792-3510 (phone)
650-578-4548 (fax)

Left & Above, Pages 37 & 38:
- **Suspicious USPS Activity**
- Black SUV giving ballots to USPS drivers in a parking lot…
- Because of Mail-in-Ballots, the postal service and all of their employees, becomes potential vectors to foul play.

From: Paul <barrettpw@gmail.com>
Date: October 26, 2020 at 10:33:36 AM CDT
To: Betsy Webster <Betsy.Webster@kctv5.com>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] JoCo voter story

Betsy,

I saw your story about voter confusion in JoCo that included an interview with Connie Schmidt. She indicated that their office will verify the driver's license number and signature before issuing a ballot.

That is an inaccurate statement, at least in my case. I received multiple (total of 5) letters from the Center for Voter Information group out of Springfield MO, with applications for a mail in ballot. After the 3rd one I decided to test the system. On the application I made up a drivers license number and had someone else sign my name. This was mailed to the JOCO election office on 9/10/20.

I received an advance ballot in the mail on Oct 16th. I attempted to reach the election commissioners office and left messages both Mon and Tues the 19th and 20th. I called again on Wed the 21st and eventually spoke to Deborah Tyrell (deputy commissioner). She confirmed this was an official ballot and after explaining how I applied, she confirmed that it shouldn't have been issued.

I understand that they are processing a large amount of applications/ballots, but I was disappointed to hear the election commissioner state that safeguards are in place to prevent what actually happened in my case.

Paul Barrett
barrettpw@gmail.com
913-269-7569

From: Tyrrel, Debbie, ELC
To: Schmidt, Connie, ELC; Phillips, Kathy, ELC; Hernandez, Elizabeth, ELC
Cc: Sherman, Fred, ELC; Hunt, Zach, ELC
Subject: RE: Paul Barrett
Date: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 1:03:00 PM
Attachments: image001.png

I do not have strong feelings either way. I think he knows now he could be in trouble and that is why he keeps calling to say he was not trying to break the law.

Debbie

From: Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>
Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 12:35 PM
To: Tyrrel, Debbie, ELC <Debbie.Tyrrel@jocogov.org>; Phillips, Kathy, ELC <Kathy.Phillips@jocogov.org>; Hernandez, Elizabeth, ELC <Elizabeth.Hernandez@jocogov.org>
Cc: Sherman, Fred, ELC <Fred.Sherman@jocogov.org>; Hunt, Zach, ELC <Zach.Hunt@jocogov.org>
Subject: RE: Paul Barrett

I think I already talked to this person yesterday and left him a voice message but he did not return my call. I told him his signature on file matched the signature on the application and we already had his driver's license on file, which was verified by DMV. I'm on the fence about turning him over to the DA. I think he has discovered that our verification system is in place. Signatures do change over time – and Elizabeth and I both reviewed the signatures on file on his record.

Connie Schmidt, CERA
Election Commissioner
Johnson County Election Office
2101 East Kansas City Road Olathe, Kansas 66061
Direct 913-715-6807 | Fax 913-791-1753
Office 913-715-6800 | TDD 800-766-3777

JOHNSON COUNTY

From: Tyrrel, Debbie, ELC <Debbie.Tyrrel@jocogov.org>
Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 12:05 PM
To: Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>; Phillips, Kathy, ELC <Kathy.Phillips@jocogov.org>; Hernandez, Elizabeth, ELC <Elizabeth.Hernandez@jocogov.org>
Cc: Sherman, Fred, ELC <Fred.Sherman@jocogov.org>; Hunt, Zach, ELC <Zach.Hunt@jocogov.org>

Subject: Paul Barrett

Someone forwarded his call to me. He wanted to report that he falsified information on his advance application and still received a regular ballot. He said he "made up" a driver's license number, gave a phone number he has not had for 8 years, and had a friend sign his signature. He said he was a law-abiding citizen and was just testing the system. He was trying to prove that the system in Kansas is not reliable and there is clearly room for voter fraud. He said he was not trying to break the law, he always obeys laws, but there are people out there who would break the law and would get a ballot. Kathy said it sounded like the voter that Elizabeth talked to yesterday.

He said he never intended to vote by mail, he just wanted to prove his point and he wanted an explanation from me of why he got a ballot. Kathy and Elizabeth looked him up for me and I called him back and told him that his signature was compared to a signature on his record from 2009 and that people's signatures do change as they age. I told him he had a driver's license number on his record that had already been verified by DMV. I said whoever processed his application had given him the benefit of the doubt

His wife and son voted at Okun and he intended all along to vote in-person at Okun and wanted to know if he could still do that. I told him he could vote a provisional ballot at Okun and update his signature in the process. I said I thought he should do that, rather than vote a ballot that he got under false pretenses. He asked if his signature going forward would be compared to the signature that his friend signed on the application, and I said we did not normally clip the signatures from applications.

He wanted to complain several times about the Center for Voter Information, which is supposed to be nonpartisan, but only sent applications (5) to him, a registered democrat, and not his wife or son who are registered republicans. He said he finally sent in the third application they sent him just to test the system, that he does not break the law. Several times he said he always followed the law.

We think he is the voter that talked to Elizabeth. He may have talked to Connie. Zach thought we should turn him over to the DA. For all these reasons, I thought I should put this in writing.

Debbie Tyrrel, CERA
Deputy Election Commissioner

Above Pages: 53, 54, & 55:

- Interesting case where a registered democrat reported that he received 5-five letters from the "**Center of Voter Information" group**. He decided to test the system, making up data….
- His registered Republican wife and son, only received one letter.
- More on next slide.

1. KORA File: 20211223080824428.pdf, 91 pages, Date Range: 09/10 - 11/24/2020, Text Messages & Email from Connie Schmidt

Sent: Monday, October 26, 2020 5:23 PM
To: Buhl, Mary, LGL <Mary.Buhl@jocogov.org>
Cc: Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>
Subject: Fraudulent ballot issued.

Mary:
We are sending you a case that we think should go to the District Attorney in violation of K.S.A. 25-2411(c). It is rather long, so if you would read the emails, it will explain everything. This man is going to go on TV and tell his story.

If you think there is a case, please send to the DA and copy Connie and me.

Thank you!

Debbie Tyrrel, CERA

Deputy Election Commissioner
Johnson County Election Office

From:	Carter, Nathan, ELC
To:	Schmidt, Connie, ELC
Cc:	Tyrrel, Debbie, ELC
Subject:	FW: Fraudulent ballot issued
Date:	Monday, October 26, 2020 3:54:41 PM
Attachments:	image001.png

Just a heads-up, Betsy Webster from KCTV5 plans to do a follow up from her story last week. There's a voter who requested a ballot with an intentionally incorrect DL number and signature and received a ballot. I copied Debbie because she spoke to the voter.

Thank you, Connie.

Nathan Carter
Office Administrator
Johnson County Election Office
2101 E. Kansas City Road, Olathe, Kansas 66061
Direct 913-715-6811 | Office 913-715-6800
Fax 913-791-1753 | TDD 1-800-766-3777

CENTER FOR voterinformation ✓   About Us ˅   Voting Information   Register To Vote   Media Center   Got Mail?   Vote By Mail   DONATE

Make An Informed Choice

Center for Voter Information is a non-profit, non-partisan partner organization to Voter Participation Center, both founded to provide resources and tools to help voting-eligible citizens register and vote in upcoming elections.

With our partner organization, Voter Participation Center, we have helped more than 5.7 million voters register and get to the polls in our history.

Above and Right:
- From the Center for Voter Information Website

Left, Pages 50 & 52:
- From previous slide, this gentleman, Paul Barrett, self reported that he falsified data and was still able to receive a ballot.
- Because this story reached the news room of KCTV5, they decided to forward this case to the County DA for prosecution.
- The "*Center for Voter Information*", probably did not receive a phone call for their part in this… just guessing.
- This case begs the question, **how many times could this have happened?**

12

October 16, 2020

The Honorable Scott Schwab
Kansas Secretary of State
First Floor, Memorial Hall
120 SW 10th Ave
Topeka, KS 66612

Dear Secretary Schwab:

It is with pleasure that I certify to you the following information as we finalize our preparation for the November 3, 2020 General Election:

Election Programming
The General Election programming was completed in house by a team of qualified staff. The programming was performed in a secure room on a secured, certified system. Our policy requires that two authorized staff be present anytime that system is accessed. This policy is enforced through an auditable badge swipe system and video surveillance.

Proofing
The General Election data, including precincts, districts, candidates and final ballots, were proofed by a team of three staff who were not involved in the creation of the data being proofed.

Vendors
It is the policy of the Johnson County Election Office that our election data will be created, maintained and controlled by the staff of this office.

Election Systems & Software
Election Systems & Software (ES&S) is the manufacturer and vendor for the statewide voter registration system, owned and administered by your office as well as the voting system in use in Johnson County.

KnowInk
KnowInk is the developer of the Poll Pad electronic poll book in use in Johnson County.

Konnech
Konnech is the developer of Poll Chief, the election management software that Johnson County uses to manage polling places and election workers.

SeaChange
Originally a customer of ES&S Ballot Printing and Mailing, Johnson County Election Office's ballot printing and mailing services contract is now administered by SeaChange. For the November 3, 2020 General Election, 142,016 ballots were printed and mailed by SeaChange for the initial mailing of ballots requested by Johnson County registrants.

Connectivity of systems
To ensure the security of our elections, Johnson County has verified the absence of modems on all voting machines in use. This includes the DS200 precinct scanners, DS450 and DS850 high-speed central count scanners and the ExpressVote ballot marking devices. These machines have not been and will not ever be connected to the Internet in any manner.

The ElectionWare system operates on a closed, air-gapped network in a locked, secured area of our building. Like the machines it programs, this system has not been and will never be connected to the Internet in any manner.

The Poll Pad electronic poll book does perform automatic, encrypted syncing during the advance voting period. This ensures that no voter has an opportunity to vote more than once. Per the Kansas Election Standards, this connection is owned and managed by the Johnson County Election Office. It is secured and all data is encrypted in motion and at rest.

The ePulse management platform that Poll Pads use for syncing and election management does not have a live connection to ELVIS. All data moves through the electronic poll book module. This process is managed by qualified members of my staff and data is reconciled at each step in the process.

Poll Chief is a cloud-hosted software platform. It does not have a live connection to any other segment of our election management systems. Unique usernames and passwords are used and are managed by my staff to ensure appropriate use of the system. IP address restrictions are in place to further control access to this system.

Backup
Certified versions of the ES&S EVS software have been obtained from the testing lab and are securely stored for disaster recovery purposes. Full backups of the ElectionWare election database are stored in a locked, fireproof safe at the Election Office. In addition to software backups, a full backup server with clients is available in case of primary hardware failure.

Pre-election testing
Full logic and accuracy testing has been completed on all pieces of equipment scheduled to be used in this election. This testing included all ballot marking devices, tabulation equipment and electronic poll books and was performed by trained temporary staff under the supervision of full-time staff. All results are audited against the expected outcome of the test deck.

Version control
The following versions of software are in use by Johnson County at this date. I have included copies of certification information for all systems requiring certification.

Equipment	Use	Version
Balotar	Ballot on Demand Printing	3.0.5.0 / 3.0.5.1
ELVIS	Statewide voter registration	14.5.1568.8
ES&S EVS		6.0.2.0
ElectionWare*	Programming / results	5.0.1.0
DS200*	Precinct scanner	3.2.0.0
DS450*	High-speed central count	3.1.0.0
DS850*	High-speed central count	3.1.0.0
ExpressVote*	Ballot marking device	2.4.0.0
Poll Pad	Electronic poll book	2.5.0

*Denotes item requiring state and federal certification

I understand the important relationship that exists between our offices as we work together to make voting possible for the citizens of Johnson County. On behalf of the county, my staff and the people we serve, thank you for your support of this important endeavor.

Be safe. Stay well.

Sincerely,

Connie Schmidt
Election Commissioner

Enclosure

CC: Bryan Caskey, Director of Elections, Kansas Secretary of State
Penny Postoak Ferguson, County Manager, Johnson County, KS
Joe Waters, Assistant County Manager, Johnson County, KS

Above Pages 64, 65, & 66:
- This an <u>internal certification</u> of the election system.
- **Shouldn't there be an External Certification?**
- This is a well crafted letter to report to the public that essentially none of the equipment is ever connected to the internet.

- CONNECTIVITY – Show me the data! Where is the third-party report that certifies these statements?
- We know from the messages in slide 25 that Election Officials did not verify this on their own or through a third-party, they simply asked the vendor.
- **See the report on slides 42, 43, & 44 for more on ES&S's known deception on the use of wireless modems.**

CTCL Grant Funding - Johnson County

Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>

Thu 10/8/2020 7:32 AM

To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>

📎 1 attachments (49 KB)

CTCL Election Grant Breifing Sheet (002).docx;

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

FYI – We received approval of our request for grant funding from CTCL in the amount of $856,256. The BOCC will take action this morning to accept the grant and sign off on receiving the funding. The briefing sheet is attached for your information.

Connie Schmidt, CERA
Election Commissioner
Johnson County Election Office

JOHNSON COUNTY KANSAS   **Briefing Sheet**

To: Board of County Commissioners
Penny Postoak Ferguson, County Manager
From: Connie Schmidt, Election Commissioner
Date: October 8, 2020
Re: The Center for Tech and Civic Life election grant approval

Issue: Consider accepting a grant from The Center for Tech and Civic Life in the amount of $856,245, to be used for the purpose of planning and operationalizing safe and secure election administration in Johnson County in 2020.

Suggested Motion: I move to accept a grant from The Center for Tech and Civic Life, in the amount of $856,245, to be used for the purpose of planning and operationalizing safe and secure election administration in Johnson County in 2020.

Background: Johnson County, Kansas faces significant challenges in executing the November 3, 2020 general election. The Election office applied for grant funding made available through The Center for Tech and Civic Life to help offset the costs associated with planning, training, and implementing strategies to ensure for a safe and secure election.

Specifically, Johnson County has faced an unprecedented volume of advance voting applications and ballots, the difficulty of training a larger number of election workers in smaller class sizes, and the added priority of keeping voters and election workers safe and healthy as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

For the general election, the number of total registered voters is expected to be 450,000 casting ballots split between the three (3) options for voting: early voting by mail, early voting in person, and voting on Election Day.

Analysis: The Election office preliminary budget estimates show below how the grant funds will be utilized upon approval. Also, materials have been submitted that outline the details of the operation and costs associated with each of the categories listed below.

Absentee Ballot Assembly and Processing Equipment	$249,360
Early Voting Sites and Ballot Drop-off Options	$195,640
In-person Voting at Polling Places on Election Day	$400,025
Secure Drop boxes and related needs	$11,220
TOTAL	**$856,245**

Funding Overview: Acceptance of The Center for Tech and Civic Life grant will not require any additional county financial support.

Alternatives: The following alternatives are available to the Board.
    A. Accept the grant in the full amount that has been awarded
    B. Accept the grant in a lessor amount
    C. Do not accept the grant

Recommendation: Staff recommends accepting the grant in the full amount awarded.

Purchasing Review: This item does not need Purchasing approval.

Budget Review: Budget and Financial Planning has reviewed and approved this briefing sheet.

Above & Right, Pages 71 & 72:
- Above is the acceptance of the CTCL funding for $856,256 for JOCO.
- To the right you can find how the money was designed to be spent.

Cancelling a mail ballot request

Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>

Mon 9/21/2020 1:33 PM

To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>

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Should we develop our own internal process for managing these county by county or do you want a uniform system statewide? The quantity that we are dealing with makes this very difficult to treat all voters the same – which is my primary concern. I will not be able to guarantee that we can cancel every request for a mail ballot.

Let me know when you can............

Connie Schmidt, CERA
Election Commissioner
Johnson County Election Office

Above, Page 81 :
- Re, Mail Ballot Cancellation Requests.
- **Because this election system and approach was being custom designed on the fly, there was no consistency on how to address issues in a standard approach across all counties.**
- **Thus, voters were not treated the same across the state.**
- **This email would indicate that advanced ballots were being mailed out ahead of time; even without a request for one.**
- Thus, the voters were requesting they not be sent.
- Seems like a recipe for chaos and for fraud.
- **A bedrock of American democracy is equal protection under the law, and that government in an election provide for equal treatment of all voters. In 2020, KS did not.**

From: Hunt, Zach, ELC <Zach.Hunt@jocogov.org>
Sent: Wednesday, July 1, 2020 5:37 PM
To: Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>; Nixon, Bill, DTI <Bill.Nixon@jocogov.org>; Epperson, Mike, DTI <Mike.Epperson@jocogov.org>
Cc: Sherman, Fred, ELC <Fred.Sherman@jocogov.org>; Gomez, Donna, DTI <Donna.Gomez@jocogov.org>
Subject: FW: Webinar Announcement: EI-ISAC Endpoint Detection and Response Pilot Program for Local Election Offices - TLP Amber

FYI – looks like we've been volunteered to participate in this program. The webinar will be on July 8th.

Zachary Hunt
Election Technology Specialist

Johnson County Election Office
2101 E. Kansas City Rd. Olathe, Kansas 66061
Direct 913-715-6833 | Office 913-715-6800

JOHNSON COUNTY KANSAS
Election Office

jocoelection.org | @jocoelection | F/jocoelection

From: elections <elections@msisac.org>
Sent: Wednesday, July 1, 2020 4:25 PM
Subject: Webinar Announcement: EI-ISAC Endpoint Detection and Response Pilot Program for Local Election Offices - TLP Amber

This message came from outside of Johnson County Government - please use caution when opening attachments or links.

TLP: AMBER

The Elections Infrastructure ISAC (EI-ISAC®) is rolling out a voluntary pilot to deploy Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) protection. Your Secretary of State/State Board of Elections has selected your office as a potential participant in this voluntary program.

EDR is a threat detection and prevention software capability that can quickly identify and limit the spread of malicious activity across an election environment. EDR can also help pinpoint how a system was compromised. This pilot can help you and your teams secure high value election infrastructure assets in advance of the 2020 General Election. For additional information, please refer to the attached EDR Pilot Program Overview.

Immediately following this email you will receive a calendar invitation for a webinar on Wednesday, July 8 at 2 PM ET. The webinar will further outline the details of this program and the deployment process. Local election officials are encouraged to participate and invite additional staff, such as their IT and security teams.

Please direct any questions to elections@cisecurity.org.

24×7 Security Operations Center
Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC)
31 Tech Valley Drive
East Greenbush, NY 12061
SOC@cisecurity.org - 1-866-787-4722

Elections Infrastructure ISAC

Drop boxes

Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>
Tue 9/1/2020 12:58 PM

To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Any idea when the order will be placed for the drop boxes? Can we order more through the SOS Office? And, I wanted to confirm we are right now getting 7 – and do you know when they would be delivered? I'm full of questions..............thanks much!

Connie Schmidt, CERA
Election Commissioner
Johnson County Election Office
2101 East Kansas City Road Olathe, Kansas 66061
Direct 913-715-6807 | Fax 913-791-1753
Office 913-715-6800 | TDD 800-766-3777

JOHNSON COUNTY KANSAS
Election Office

jocoelection.org | @jocoelection | F/jocoelection

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Above, Page 10:
- 7 Drop Boxes ordered by JOCO.

Left, Page 43:
- **CIS** / EI-ISAC is Election Infrastructure – Information Sharing and Analysis Center
- EDR is an Endpoint Detection and Response EDR Software. That reportedly detects **"on-line" malicious activity.**
- This is a voluntary program that SOS Schwab must have assigned to JOCO staff… likely others.
- This group alerted JOCO of potential threats, as later emails will show.

March 24, 2020

TO: Election Office Staff

FR: Connie Schmidt, Election Commissioner

RE: Work from Home Guidelines

Effective immediately, our office will begin compliance with the County's Work from Home policy.

Pending authorization from the Secretary of State's office to work from home on ELVIS, those employees that can process voter registration and advance by mail ballot applications will operate in split shifts.

Kathy Phillips is responsible for making assignments for the split shift teams. These teams will also be responsible for answering the phone and responding to candidate filing requests. While on-site please remember to abide by the social distancing rule of 6 feet.

The remaining employees in the office are in the **work from home** category, except for specific on-site election-related duties, i.e. DeSoto mail ballot election. Everyone has been provided VPN connectivity via county-issued laptops with communication via Microsoft Teams, email and/or conference calls.

Kathy and Josh will be responsible for assigning work at home duties to their team members. Everyone is expected to (at a minimum) provide a daily status update.

I know this is a challenging time and not the way our office is accustomed to working. A special thank you to Zach for getting us set up in Microsoft Teams! Communication is critical moving forward over the next 30 days.

As always, thank you for your FLEXIBILITY, COMMITMENT, DEDICATION, AND TEAMWORK – just a few of the competencies that define our office.

cc: Joe Waters, Assistant County Manager

        Bryan Caskey, Director of Elections, Kansas Secretary of State's Office

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Left: Page 61:
JOCO Election Employees can communicate to ELVIS from home, via the web, in order to process voter registrations and advance mail ballot applications.

This creates hundreds of new access routes into the election system.

Right: Page 68:
JOCO Election Employees Work From Home Solution – allows employees to communicate to ELVIS – the **Election Voter Information System, via the internet.** ELVIS is software made by ES&S.

Johnson County Work From Home Solution

In response to the rapidly changing COVID-19 situation, on Saturday, March 22, 2020, the Johnson County Government issued at Stay-At-Home order effective March 24, 2020.

All Election employees conducting critical work have been issued county laptops. These laptops adhere to all current Johnson County Government security standards and come equipped with an endpoint security management system.

Johnson County has implemented a tiered approach to work from home security that combines:

- Two-factor authentication
- A virtual private network (VPN)
- Remote desktop connection to the users' main computer, which also adheres to all Johnson County security standards and is equipped with an endpoint management system.
- A policy that while working in ELVIS, no other internet application should be used (e-mail, web browsing, etc.)

The approach that Johnson County has taken provides a secure way to connect back to the Johnson County Network from home. All work done from home will be done on computers located in the office remotely via the Remote Desktop Connection.

This tiered approach to work from home security, combined with the security standards implemented by the SOS Office within ELVIS (two-factor authentication, multiple user login steps, and the Citrix Environment), allows for a secure way for the Election team to work on critical ELVIS functions while complying with the Stay-At-Home order.

Johnson County is looking to utilize this solution to work in ELVIS while the Stay-At-Home order is in effect. If approved, this will allow the Election team to keep all ELVIS records up to date in a timely manner and have access to the system that enables them to answer public questions while limiting the number of staff that must be assigned to the office to complete essential work.

3. KORA File: 20211223081034342.pdf 76 pages
E-mail Communications from 03/23 - 06/19/2020 from Connie Schmidt

From: Lehman, Tabitha M. <tabitha.lehman@sedgwick.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, April 1, 2020 12:23 PM
To: Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>; andrew.howell@snco.us; Newby, Bruce
<bnewby@WYCOKCK.ORG>; Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Subject: RE: (EXTERNAL) RE: Good news from Sedgwick County

We went with EasyVote, Pollchief was also in the running but ultimately we were hoping for an off the shelf
solution that we could import our data into instead of having to build it all up. The price point difference was
rather significant as well. PollChief looks like a great product and had rave reviews from customers so I knew
whichever we ended up with, we would have been happy!

The County Commission board has also voted to find a new building for us where our office and warehouse are in
the same location. Of course, that was voted on before this craziness began and I certainly understand if this
delays that process.

Tabitha Lehman | Election Commissioner | Sedgwick County Election Office
p: (316) 660-7100 | f: (316) 660-7125 | Tabitha.Lehman@sedgwick.gov
510 N Main, Suite 101 | Wichita, KS 67203 |www.sedgwickcounty.org | Facebook | Twitter

Sedgwick County...
working for you

Got Photo ID?
TAKE IT TO THE POLLS
gotVoterID.com

From: Schmidt, Connie, ELC [mailto:Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org]
Sent: Wednesday, April 01, 2020 12:11 PM
To: Lehman, Tabitha M. <tabitha.lehman@sedgwick.gov>; andrew.howell@snco.us; Newby, Bruce
<bnewby@WYCOKCK.ORG>; Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Subject: (EXTERNAL) RE: Good news from Sedgwick County

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you
recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Sedgwick County Division of Information and Technology

Which vendor are you using????? Too exciting I'm ready to take a road trip to visit your office as soon this VIRUS
goes away..

Connie

Left: Page 56:
Sedgwick Co purchased voting software from EasyVote

Right: From EasyVote's Website: Their data is stored in the AZURA Cloud rather than on servers; taking it out of our control.

18

E-mail Communications from 03/23 - 06/19/2020 from Connie Schmidt

RE: Friday conference call

Schmidt, Connie, ELC <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>

Thu 5/21/2020 12:22 PM

To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

FYI – the BOCC approved the purchase of the DS200's for every polling place this morning. The Express votes will now be used as Ballot Marking Devices. Voters will have a choice to vote on paper or the BMD. Easier opening, easier closing on Election Day = quicker return of USB's for vote tabulation on Election Night. We will now be operating on the same platform as Shawnee, Wyandotte, and Sedgwick counties. This sets the stage for more uniform policies and procedures, such as Logic and Accuracy Testing and poll worker training, etc.

DS200 are being delivered the week of 6/1. Acceptance testing will be finished by the end of that week.

Connie Schmidt, CERA
Election Commissioner
Johnson County Election Office
2101 East Kansas City Road Olathe, Kansas 66061
Direct 913-715-6807 | Fax 913-791-1753
Office 913-715-6800 | TDD 800-766-3777

JOHNSON COUNTY
KANSAS
Election Office

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PRECINCT SCANNER AND TABULATOR
DS200®

The DS200 is a precinct-based ballot scanner and vote tabulator that combines the flexibility and efficiency of digital-imaging technology to support paper-based voting — taking traditional optical-scan ballot vote tabulation into the twenty-first century.

Security features:
- Physical and System Access Controls
- Audit Logs
- Proprietary Flash Drives
- System Application Controls
- Encryption, Hash Validation and Digital Signatures

Download product one-sheet
Download security bulletin
Request more information
Find your rep

UNIVERSAL VOTING SYSTEM
ExpressVote®

The paper-based ExpressVote Universal Voting System uses touch-screen technology that produces a paper record for tabulation. As a marker, the ExpressVote handles the entire marking process, eliminating unclear marks and the need for interpretation of the voter's mark.

Security features:
- Physical and System Access Controls
- Verifiable Paper Record
- Audit Logs
- Proprietary Flash Drives
- System Application Controls
- Encryption, Hash Validation and Digital Signatures

Download product one-sheet
Download security bulletin
Request more information
Find your rep

Above: Page 23:
This is FYI… "The BOCC approved DS200's for every polling place." The DS200 is a Scanner & Tabulator. The "Express Vote" mentioned is a "ballot marking device" used in Shawnee, Wyandotte, Sedgwick and Johnson Counties….

Above: DS200 & ExpressVote brochures from the ES&S Website

DS200®

Precinct Scanner & Tabulator

Protective Cover

Cover has heavy-duty rubber seal to shelter DS200 from elements during transport.

Easy to Set Up

Lid-up, power-on approach allows poll workers to easily open polls.

Touch-Screen Display

Provides voters with instructions and immediate feedback. Tension bearings hold screen in place for custom positioning.

Ballot/Card Slot

Voters cast both ballots and vote summary cards here; accommodates up to 19-inch ballots.

Auxiliary Ballot Compartment

Main Ballot Compartment

Easy, hassle-free storage of up to 3,500 ballots.

Enhanced Voting Experience

The DS200 is a precinct-based scanner and vote tabulator equipped with the latest in ES&S' patented technology. Fully certified and compliant with EAC guidelines, the DS200 enhances the voting experience for voters and election officials alike. Our patented Intelligent Mark Recognition (IMR®) and patented Positive Target Recognition & Alignment Compensation (PTRAC®) technologies ensure even the most poorly marked ballots are read accurately and consistently — protecting voter intent. All of this is designed to make everyone's job easier.

11 14-inch flat ballots processed per minute

DS200® — Precinct Scanner & Tabulator

ACCURATE

The DS200 combines the ES&S-patented IMR® and PTRAC® systems to accurately track and pinpoint target locations. This technology accommodates ballots inserted at angles or with erroneous marks to uphold voter intent. This precision improves the reliability of elections.

RELIABLE

Having both battery backup and thermal paper means you never have to worry about power outages or printer ink. The DS200 includes redundant data storage.

SECURE

Like all ES&S tabulation equipment, the DS200 includes physical security features such as locking panels and security seals to secure sensitive components and election files, and a key-locked case for transport and shipping. The DS200 operating system controls, limits and detects unauthorized access to all critical data. The system also includes safeguards, such as data encryption and digital signatures, that help protect sensitive data and verify authenticity, including certification of all firmware.

COMPATIBLE

Works in conjunction with:
- ExpressVote® Universal Voting System
- DS450® High-Throughput Scanner & Tabulator
- DS850® High-Speed Scanner & Tabulator
- DS950® High-Speed Scanner & Tabulator
- Electionware® Election Management Software
- AutoMARK® Ballot Marking Device
- Election Reporting Manager®

> ❝ The election yesterday went so well, I hugged my DS200 at the end of the night."
>
> ANNETTE STASHEK, COUNTY CLERK
> PORTAGE COUNTY, WISCONSIN

DS200 brochures from the ES&S Website

ExpressVote®
Universal Voting System

*EXPRESSVOTE brochure from the ES&S Website*

Easier-to-Read Ballots
Visual aids include high contrast and zoom functionality.

Multilingual
Supports any language in audio and 12+ in text.

Avoids Overvoting
The intuitive interface also alerts voters of ballot exceptions, like undervotes.

ADA-Friendly
The front access panel provides ports for headphones and accessibility devices.

ExpressVote
1 Insert Card
2 Touch Selections
3 Verify Selections

Simple Activation
The voter inserts a card to activate the voting session. After voting is complete, the vote summary card is dispensed for voter review.

A Versatile Solution
- Vote Centers
- Precinct Poll Places
- Early Voting
- Election Day

Together with the ExpressPoll® electronic pollbook and ExpressVote® Printer, you can quickly check in voters and serve up to 15,000 different ballot styles. This means no more picking and pulling ballots or wasted pre-printed stock — voters get in and out faster.

CHECK IN → RECEIVE BALLOT → VOTE → TABULATE

3.0.0 | © 2021 Election Systems & Software, LLC. For certification details, visit essvote.com/certification

---

ExpressVote® Universal Voting System

EASY ELECTION MANAGEMENT

- Reduces costs by eliminating the need for printing and storing traditional pre-printed paper ballots.
- Simplifies post-election management because there are no unclear marks to adjudicate. Voters are prompted in real-time to address over/undervotes.
- Produces a voter-verifiable paper record that is scanned, tabulated and saved for auditing purposes.
- Prevents poll workers from giving voters the wrong ballot style since they don't need to pick and pull ballots.
- Maximizes your investment as it can be used many ways — in precincts and vote centers during early voting and on Election Day.

POLL WORKERS LOVE IT

- Shorter Election Day for poll workers — six steps to open and two to close so they don't need to arrive as early or stay as late.
- Small, lightweight and easy to move and store.
- No ink or to replace on Election Day.

> **Switching to ExpressVote in 2016 and transitioning to vote centers in 2019 — it's been an easy transition for staff and poll workers.**
>
> **"Marion County voters can vote faster, easier and anywhere."**
>
> MYLA A. ELDRIDGE
> COUNTY CLERK, MARION COUNTY, INDIANA

A GREAT EXPERIENCE FOR VOTERS

- Enables all eligible voters to make their selections privately and independently. It is a fully compliant Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) voting solution.
- Improves voter confidence because the interface prompts them if they've under/overvoted a contest.
- Provides voters the opportunity to review their selections twice before tabulation — on the summary screen and on the printed card.

SECURITY YOU CAN COUNT ON®

The ExpressVote offers so many security features, we couldn't include them all here. To learn more about the great lengths we go to protect our systems and data, visit **essvote.com/feature/security**.

SPECIFICATIONS
Ballot style capacity: Up to 15,000
Languages supported: Any language in audio and 12+ in text
Assistive devices supported: Headphones, audio-tactile keypad, rocker switch device, sip-and-puff device
Dimensions (H x W x D):
Operational - 16" x 20" x 17"
Stored - 17" x 20" x 5"
Weight: 25 pounds
Battery backup: 2-4 hours

For more information visit **www.essvote.com**

Letter Report

PRO V&V

To: Steve Pearson, Sue McKay – Election Systems & Software, LLC (ES&S)

From: Wendy Owens – Pro V&V, Inc.

CC: Jack Cobb, Stephen Han – Pro V&V, Inc.

Date: October 1, 2020

Subject: ES&S ExpressVote Hardware Version 1.0, Firmware Version 1.5.0.0 Update Process

Dear ES&S:

Pro V&V is providing this letter to report the results of the evaluation effort on the ES&S ExpressVote® hardware version 1.0, (ExpressVote HW1.0) firmware version 1.5.0.0 update process. An examination was performed to confirm that the update process utilized during the state evaluation contains identical executable files as those found in the trusted build and the process does not add any additional software to the ExpressVote HW1.0.

Background

Pro V&V was contacted by ES&S to analyze an anomaly that occurred during a Texas state evaluation of the ExpressVote HW1.0 running firmware version 1.5.0.0. Pro V&V has also been in contact with the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and Texas Secretary of State regarding this evaluation. During the evaluation, the "Update" process was attempted and a hash value mismatch error was displayed for the sysload.bmp file.

Test Summary

Pro V&V compared the update disk image file to the prod_release disk image file from the Trusted Build to ensure the update disk image file contained the same files from the Trusted Build. Pro V&V used the ExamDiff Pro application with the PESnoop 2.0 plug-in to compare all files. Three files were found to be in the update disk image that were not in the prod_release disk image file. These files are listed below:

- InputOutputBoard.S19
- ScannerPrinterEngine.S19
- startup.exe

Pro V&V then compared the InputOutputBoard.S19 and ScannerPrinterEngine.S19 to the Trusted Build for EVS 6.0.0.0 where these artifacts were originally created. The SHA-256 hash values were the same as the files in the update disk image file. The startup.exe file was also hashed from EVS 6.0.0.0 and produced the following SHA-256 hash value:

startup.exe - 85f8d210ca9ad2433c4dbe154aee31f9d75968f908dc114e91adc26fd0f85731

LR-01-02-ESS-01.00   1 of 3

Pro V&V then retrieved the sysload.bmp from EVS 5.2.2.0, as presented in Photograph 1.

Photograph 1: EVS 5.2.2.0 sysload.bmp

This file produces a SHA-256 value of the following:

sysload.bmp - b3a230dc5ff31311a9f83b5bfee22ac96291c57f0c84abd05852aabf605ebbe3

The sysload.bmp file from EVS 6.0.2.0 was retrieved, as depicted in Photograph 2.

Photograph 2: EVS 6.0.2.0 sysload.bmp

This file produces a SHA-256 value of the following:

sysload.bmp - 07015a3e4d71e8683d3bf21b3d427f007a89b35d236767aedd35c4d94c3d8a12

In addition, Pro V&V upgraded a production EVS 5.2.2.0 ExpressVote HW1.0 device using EVS 6.0.2.0 USB update image. Pro V&V followed the validation procedures detailed in the Verification Procedure: ExpressVote Hardware 1.0 document to verify the hash values of all software on the device, noting the sysload.bmp verification was a mismatch. It was observed to have no impact on functionality.

LR-01-02-ESS-01.00   2 of 3

After conducting this verification, Pro V&V loaded the EVS 6.0.2.0 prod_release image onto an additional ExpressVote HW1.0 device via an Innodisk. Pro V&V then performed the same validation procedures outlined previously and noted there were no verification discrepancies.

Conclusion

Based on the testing performed and the results obtained, it was verified that the only difference in the two products was the sysload.bmp file and no additional software was placed on the devices during the update process.

Should you require additional information or would like to discuss this matter further, please contact me at 256-713-1111.

Sincerely,

Wendy Owens

Wendy Owens
VSTL Program Manager
wendy.owens@provandv.com

LR-01-02-ESS-01.00   3 of 3

- Left: Pages 64 & 65 and page 1 of subsequent file compilation (20211223081239239.pdf)

- Pro V&V, Inc was contracted to evaluate/certify the Express Vote system. They found 3 anomalies. Three extra files were found on the system.

- **Pro V&V concluded that although there was <u>one discrepancy</u> in software, it had no impact on functionality.**

- **The next slide, emails from ES&S, expands on this issue in further detail.**

FAQ Regarding the ExpressVote Copyright BitMap Image Update
Revised Oct 1, 2020

Q: What is the situation?

Some ExpressVote 1.0 ballot marking devices display a copyright image with the wrong date on the splash screen when the unit is powered up. *This does not, has not, and will not impact any function of the machine, which has been proven to be and will continue to be secure, accurate and reliable.* This copyright image is meaningless in regard to unit performance.

Q: What is the effect of an incorrect copyright image?

Units which have the incorrect copyright – a bitmap image that simply indicates an incorrect year - will not provide a 100% firmware hash validation match.

Every ExpressVote unit operates as designed and tested. The security, accuracy and reliability of the system are proven and documented through numerous EAC federal certifications and extensive post-election audits. The incorrect copyright bitmap file image is cosmetic in nature.

Q: I've heard the term hash validation —what does that mean?

A hash validation is designed to ensure data integrity. It is an independent check and validation which verifies that the firmware on the unit matches the version of the firmware that was federally, and state tested and approved.

Q: How did the wrong copyright image get there?

When some ExpressVote 1.0 units were last updated with the latest firmware, one file —the file containing the copyright image—did not correctly update.

Q: Why did it not correctly update?

During either the initial installation process or subsequent upgrade, a single copyright file (a bitmap photo) did not correctly transfer to some ExpressVote 1.0 units that were upgraded via a USB drive.

Q: How do we know this is the only thing that didn't correctly update?

ES&S commissioned an independent analysis by a NIST-accredited Voting System Test Laboratory (VSTL) to confirm the root cause of the hash validation mismatch stems from the incorrect copyright image photo. The analysis will further confirm that the incorrect copyright image has zero impact on the operation of the voting system and that all system files – with the exception if the copyright image - match exactly. The report will be made available to customers upon receipt.

Q: What does this mean in terms of the accuracy and performance of these units?

This issue has zero impact on any accuracy, security, or performance.

Q: Does this need to be corrected?

For the ExpressVote to operate as expected, this does not need to be corrected, however ES&S will work with each State Election Authority to determine the State's requirements as it relates to the timing of applying the correct bitmap image. The current file image has zero impact on the performance, accuracy, or security of the units.

Q: Were any previous elections impacted or compromised by having the incorrect copyright screen?

No. The incorrect copyright image file has no impact on any previous elections, nor does it affect future elections.

**Q: How and when was this issue discovered?**

During a recent certification event in Texas, one of the examiners noticed the firmware on some units was not an exact match to standards. ES&S immediately worked to investigate the issue.

Q: How will corrections be put in place?

A firmware update will be applied to each identified unit to correct the single file image. Following the upgrade, a hash validation will be performed to confirm the correction was applied.

Q: What does this issue look like?

See the two images below. The image on the left shows an older copyright image, and the photo on the right shows a current copyright image.

ES&S appreciates the work that is done by the nation's Election Officials and we pledge to work with our customers to ensure that elections are accurate, secure and fully transparent. If you have any questions regarding the information contained within this FAQ, please don't hesitate to reach out to your ES&S representative.

- Left: Page 62 & 63:

- These two pages were attachments from a 9/29/2020 email from Victor Williams, Sr. Vice Pres-Product Development of ES&S to Bryan Caskey, Dir of Elections.

- ES&S admits they **failed** the validation test of the ExpressVote Software, but claim this has no impact on the performance of the machine and accuracy.

- There were no other communications indicating certification of the other election systems, such as the ES&S DS200.

4. KORA File: 20211223081143828.pdf   65 pages
E-mail Communications from 03/23 - 06/19/2020 from Bryan Caskey regarding ES&S

- Right: Page 58 & 59:

- In an October 1, 2020 email <u>from</u> Victor Williams, Sr. Vice Pres- Product Development of ES&S <u>to</u> Bryan Caskey, Dir of Elections.

- There is no context other than this list of counties included in the same string of emails regarding the failed validation of the Express Vote System.

- But I would **<u>assume</u>** all of these counties are implicated in the failed validation.

From: Williams, Victor
Sent: Thursday, October 1, 2020 5:59 PM
To: 'Caskey, Bryan [KSOS]' <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Subject: RE: Can we talk today?

Bryan, as discussed. Please see below.

Allen County, Kansas	KS
Atchison County, Kansas	KS
Brown County, Kansas	KS
Chautauqua County, Kansas	KS
Cloud County, Kansas	KS
Cowley County, Kansas	KS
Doniphan County, Kansas	KS
Ellsworth County, Kansas	KS
Finney County, Kansas	KS
Jewell County, Kansas	KS
Labette County, Kansas	KS
Leavenworth County, Kansas	KS
Linn County, Kansas	KS
Lyon County, Kansas	KS
Marion County, Kansas	KS
McPherson County, Kansas	KS

Mitchell County, Kansas	KS
Nemaha County, Kansas	KS
Ness County, Kansas	KS
Norton County, Kansas	KS
Osage County, Kansas	KS
Republic County, Kansas	KS
Saline County, Kansas	KS
Sedgwick County, Kansas	KS
Shawnee County, Kansas	KS
Sherman County, Kansas	KS
Smith County, Kansas	KS
Trego County, Kansas	KS
Washington County, Kansas	KS
Wichita County, Kansas	KS
Wyandotte County, Kansas	KS

RE: KS - SOS - REQUEST FOR UPDATE - IP Range Information Request - MS-ISAC Ticket 4170144

MS-ISAC SOC <SOC@msisac.org>

Fri 10/16/2020 4:13 PM

To: Victor Williams <victor.williams@essvrllc.com>; MS-ISAC SOC <SOC@msisac.org>; Jason Fletcher <jason.fletcher@essvrllc.com>; Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>; Chris Wlaschin <chris.wlaschin@essvote.com>

Cc: Nicholas Parker <Nicholas.Parker@cisecurity.org>; SOC_Supervisor.dl <SOC_Supervisor.dl@cisecurity.org>

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Victor,

Thank you for the information and update.

Regards,
Guo Hong Wu
Security Operations Center Analyst
Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)
Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC)
31 Tech Valley Drive
East Greenbush, NY 12061

24x7 Security Operations Center
SOC@cisecurity.org - 1-866-787-4722

MS-ISAC®
Multi-State Information
Sharing & Analysis Center®

Elections Infrastructure ISAC

Malicious Domain Blocking and Reporting (MDBR)
Prevent IT systems from connecting to harmful web domains at no cost

SIGN UP FOR MDBR

- Above and Center: Page 37 & 38:

- In an October 16, 2020 email **from CIS, Center for Internet Security**, **to** Victor Williams, Sr. Vice Pres-Product Development of ES&S and to Bryan Caskey, Dir of Elections.

- **They are requesting IPs/IP address ranges for monitoring purposes.**

From: Williams, Victor <victor.williams@essvrllc.com>
Sent: Friday, October 16, 2020 5:13 PM
To: MS-ISAC SOC <SOC@msisac.org>; Fletcher, Jason <jason.fletcher@essvrllc.com>; Bryan Caskey <bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov>; Wlaschin, Chris <chris.wlaschin@essvote.com>
Cc: Nicholas Parker <Nicholas.Parker@cisecurity.org>; SOC_Supervisor.dl <SOC_Supervisor.dl@cisecurity.org>
Subject: RE: KS - SOS - REQUEST FOR UPDATE - IP Range Information Request - MS-ISAC Ticket 4170144

There are no IP addresses that fit this request – we have no further updates to provide.

Thank you.

Victor Williams
Sr. Vice President - Product Development
O: 402.970.1151 | C: 402.770.2691

From: MS-ISAC SOC <SOC@msisac.org>
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2020 10:00 PM
To: Fletcher, Jason <jason.fletcher@essvrllc.com>; Williams, Victor <victor.williams@essvrllc.com>; Bryan Caskey <bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov>; Wlaschin, Chris <chris.wlaschin@essvote.com>
Cc: MS-ISAC SOC <SOC@msisac.org>; Nicholas Parker <Nicholas.Parker@cisecurity.org>; SOC_Supervisor.dl <SOC_Supervisor.dl@cisecurity.org>
Subject: KS - SOS - REQUEST FOR UPDATE - IP Range Information Request - MS-ISAC Ticket 4170144

All,

The MS-ISAC is reaching out with a follow-up on our previous request for updated information on any IPs/IP ranges within your monitored homenets that are **not** authorized or expected to communicate outside of the network. We are requesting this information with the intention of creating new signatures that will generate events with critical severity whenever this activity occurs.

The monitored homenets for your organization are below:
10.50.0.0 - 10.50.3.255

Please confirm the expected activity for your ranges and submit it to us via reply to this email. We appreciate your cooperation in this endeavor.

Center for Internet Security (CIS)
Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)
1-866-787-4722 (7x24 SOC)
Email: soc@cisecurity.org
www.cisecurity.org

25

- BELOW: from the Website of **CIS**. https://www.cisecurity.org/about-us/

- A Global Company and a non-government agency, who **has direct access to our Election Data Servers.**

- From their website:

- No logs or data reside on the sensor. All data collected is compressed, encrypted, and sent to the CIS SOC every few minutes for analysis. As alerts are analyzed and verified as actionable, event notifications are sent to your organization in accordance with pre-established escalation procedures. Notifications include which IP addresses are affected, the identified issues, mitigation recommendations, and an attachment containing all traffic associated with the event.

- **Who vetted these guys?**

CIS Center for Internet Security®
Creating Confidence in the Connected World.

Center for Internet Security
FORWARD THINKING
NON-PROFIT
PART OF A GLOBAL COMMUNITY
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST CYBER THREATS
WORKS WITH PRIVATE & PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

Alerts
No logs or data reside on the sensor. All data collected is compressed, encrypted, and sent to the CIS SOC every few minutes for analysis. As alerts are analyzed and verified as actionable, event notifications are sent to your organization in accordance with pre-established escalation procedures. Notifications include which IP addresses are affected, the identified issues, mitigation recommendations, and an attachment containing all traffic associated with the event. Additionally, your organization may utilize the CIS API service to programmatically ingest event notifications and associated logs. Our 24x7 SOC is always available to answer questions and provide any assistance as needed.

Re: Modems

Frison, Angie <angie.frison@essvote.com>
Thu 9/17/2020 10:46 AM
To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>; Kurland, Christopher <christopher.kurland@essvote.com>

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Ok good. We are hanging in there, hope you are well too. Please let us know what you need from us during preparations for November.

Thanks, Bryan.

Angie Frison
ES&S RSM
402-968-8758

From: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2020 9:43:27 AM
To: Frison, Angie <angie.frison@essvote.com>; Kurland, Christopher <christopher.kurland@essvote.com>
Subject: RE: Modems

Exactly what I needed from you. Thanks Angie.

Hope you are both well.

BRYAN A. CASKEY | Director of Elections

Kansas Secretary of State | 785-296-3488 P | 785-581-3623 C | 785-291-3051 F |
Memorial Hall, 1st Floor | 120 S.W. 10th Avenue | Topeka, KS 66612-1594

"Every election is determined by the people who show up."
- Larry J. Sabato, *Pendulum Swing*

From: Frison, Angie <angie.frison@essvote.com>
Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2020 9:41 AM
To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>; Kurland, Christopher <christopher.kurland@essvote.com>
Subject: Re: Modems

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Good morning Bryan,

I can guarantee 100% that there are no counties in Kansas who have wireless modems installed in their units. There is cost to purchase these modems which must be contractually agreed upon by both parties before any work can even begin. These modems themselves cost us a lot of money, so we would by no means ever install hardware at no cost to our customers.

We take these modem comments and questions very seriously so please let me know if I need to provide any further documentation.

One more thing, as you are well aware, modems are not certified in the state of Kansas. If we shipped an uncertified product to your state we would face serious consequences. We will not allow that to happen to our business and we also pride ourselves in following the certification guidelines.

Please let me know if you need further information from us.

Angie Frison
ES&S RSM
402-968-8758

From: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2020 9:27:04 AM
To: Frison, Angie <angie.frison@essvote.com>; Kurland, Christopher <christopher.kurland@essvote.com>
Subject: Modems

Angie / Chris:

I have received an inquiry concerning wireless modems being installed on precinct and central count scanners sold by ES&S. Would you be able to confirm or deny whether any voting equipment in Kansas sold by ES&S contains wireless modems installed on the equipment.

Thank you.

BRYAN A. CASKEY | Director of Elections

Kansas Secretary of State | 785-296-3488 P | 785-581-3623 C | 785-291-3051 F |
Memorial Hall, 1st Floor | 120 S.W. 10th Avenue | Topeka, KS 66612-1594

"Every election is determined by the people who show up."
- Larry J. Sabato, *Pendulum Swing*

- Right: Pages: 18 & 19

- September of 2020, Regarding Wireless Modems

- Angie Frison, ES&S RSM, "guarantees that 100% of Kansas Counties do not have wireless modems installed in precinct and central **count scanners** purchased from ES&S.

- **Why is the state asking the vendor about this most crucial security question, when this should be a part of the certification process?   This is like asking the "FOX" if he ate the chicken!**

- **Was a comprehensive certification process conducted on the entire election system? This must include the hardware and software for every component in the system.**

- KS has handed over the entire election system to a third party.

- Do they have network cards (wired connections)? This question was not asked.

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RE: Kansas outage

Cameron, Jeb <jeb.cameron@essvote.com>
Thu 6/11/2020 2:26 PM
To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>; Green, Kendra <kendra.green@essvrllc.com>; Beckner, Jameson [KSOS] <Jameson.Beckner@ks.gov>; Hall, Phill [KSOS] <Phill.Hall@ks.gov>

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Bryan-

Below is a recap of both a timeline of events and what we know as of now. We will continue to keep you updated as we learn more.

All times below in central timezone.

~4:27 a.m. – On-call emails triggered by multiple VR systems not being reachable by monitoring service.
~4:30 a.m. – Network engineer attempted to log onto multiples systems – none reachable.
~4:35 a.m. – Network engineer attempted to VPN directly into environment – none reachable.
~4:45 a.m. – Call made to additional engineer to determine if lack of connectivity was a local event – engineer in eastern timezone could also not access environments.
~5:00 a.m. – Initiated call to Jeb Cameron to advise of situation. Continued to monitor. Was determined that both primary and backup hosting sites were down, so failover was not possible if connectivity wasn't restored.
~6:30 a.m. – Neither site up. Made decision to start contacting customers. Initiated contact with Account Management team.
~7:45 a.m. – Connectivity restored to disaster recovery site. Preparations started for failing over all customers to disaster recovery site.
8:04 a.m. – Tierpoint restored connectivity to all datacenters. Failover actions cancelled.

What we know:
- Issue affected a total of 8 datacenters throughout the Midwest.
- Escalated as Severity 1 (Service Down) incident to Cisco, and no root cause yet determined

-Jeb

Jeb S. Cameron | Vice President, Customer Relations
ESSVR, LLC | C: 678.472.9895
jeb.cameron@essvote.com

From: Cameron, Jeb
Sent: Thursday, June 11, 2020 10:34 AM
To: 'Caskey, Bryan [KSOS]' <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>; Green, Kendra <kendra.green@essvrllc.com>; Beckner, Jameson [KSOS] <Jameson.Beckner@ks.gov>; Hall, Phill [KSOS] <Phill.Hall@ks.gov>
Subject: RE: Kansas outage

Bryan-

We can discuss it further this afternoon, but as of now, we can say with 100% certainty that this was a failure of the provider and their network connectivity. We are in active communication with them to find out exactly what happened and what they are doing to prevent it from happening again.

When we know more we will definitely share it.

-Jeb

Jeb S. Cameron | Vice President, Customer Relations
ESSVR, LLC | C: 678.472.9895
jeb.cameron@essvote.com

From: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Sent: Thursday, June 11, 2020 8:57 AM
To: Green, Kendra <kendra.green@essvrllc.com>; Beckner, Jameson [KSOS] <Jameson.Beckner@ks.gov>; Hall, Phill [KSOS] <Phill.Hall@ks.gov>
Cc: Cameron, Jeb <jeb.cameron@essvote.com>
Subject: RE: Kansas outage

Thank you for letting me know. Please keep me posted ASAP.

BRYAN A. CASKEY | Director of Elections

Kansas Secretary of State | 785-296-3488 P | 785-581-3623 C | 785-291-3051 F |
Memorial Hall, 1st Floor | 120 S.W. 10th Avenue | Topeka, KS 66612-1594

"Every election is determined by the people who show up."
- Larry J. Sabato, Pendulum Swing

From: Green, Kendra <kendra.green@essvrllc.com>
Sent: Thursday, June 11, 2020 7:34 AM
To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>; Beckner, Jameson [KSOS] <Jameson.Beckner@ks.gov>; Hall, Phill [KSOS] <Phill.Hall@ks.gov>
Cc: Cameron, Jeb <jeb.cameron@essvote.com>
Subject: Kansas outage

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Good morning

I just received notice that Tierpoint (location that hosts our servers) is experiencing an outrage.   I will update again at 8 am.

Kendra

- Right: Pages 66 & 67:

- June 11, 2020: ES&S Midwest Data Center is down.

- This was a Severity 1 (highest level) alert.

- Tierpoint is the owner and location that hosts our (ks) servers.

- https://tierpoint.com/

- Data Center Locations (below):

KS Sev 2 - Serious (Work Stoppage) Ticket Opened

ESSVR ServiceDesk <supportdesk@essvote.net>
Fri 6/12/2020 7:07 AM
To: kendra.green@essvrllc.com <kendra.green@essvrllc.com>; Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

A Sev 2 - Serious (Work Stoppage) ticket has been opened by Dill, Heather from Douglas County, KS. The ESSVR helpdesk is working on the issue and will provide an update to you shortly.

- Above: Page 62:
- June 12, 2020, ES&S Midwest Data Center is down, again.
- In file: 20211223081439003, pages 11-17, **see below**, more details were provided.
- Multiple Counties Reporting & No root cause.
- Blamed Tierpoint (the location that hosts our (ks) servers.
- Jeb Cameron of ES&S explained that the lack of network connectivity was an issue of the service provider (Tierpoint).

From: Cameron, Jeb
Sent: Thursday, June 11, 2020 10:34 AM
To: 'Caskey, Bryan [KSOS]' <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>; Green, Kendra <kendra.green@essvrllc.com>; Beckner, Jameson [KSOS] <Jameson.Beckner@ks.gov>; Hall, Phill [KSOS] <Phill.Hall@ks.gov>
Subject: RE: Kansas outage

Bryan-

We can discuss it further this afternoon, but as of now, we can say with 100% certainty that this was a failure of the provider and their network connectivity. We are in active communication with them to find out exactly what happened and what they are doing to prevent it from happening again.

When we know more we will definitely share it.

-Jeb

Jeb S. Cameron | Vice President, Customer Relations
ESSVR, LLC | C: 678.472.9845
jeb.cameron@essvote.com

KS Sev 2 - Serious (Work Stoppage) Ticket Opened

ESSVR ServiceDesk <supportdesk@essvote.net>
Thu 6/11/2020 7:02 AM
To: kendra.green@essvrllc.com <kendra.green@essvrllc.com>; Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

A Sev 2 - Serious (Work Stoppage) ticket has been opened by Gritz, Sandra from Sedgwick County, KS. The ESSVR helpdesk is working on the issue and will provide an update to you shortly.

- Right: Pages 60:
- ES&S – **Undetected activity** of an employee in ELVIS when using her Token. The Token is a physical device that acts as a key on you laptop.
- No remedy or additional conclusion provided.
- Could mean other outsiders could enter undetected as well…?

FW: (EXTERNAL) RE: Token issue

Lehman, Tabitha M. <tabitha.lehman@sedgwick.gov>
Wed 6/17/2020 9:16 AM
To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Cc: Beckner, Jameson [KSOS] <Jameson.Beckner@ks.gov>
EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

FYI…

From: Green, Kendra [mailto:kendra.green@essvrllc.com]
Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2020 9:14 AM
To: Lehman, Tabitha M. <tabitha.lehman@sedgwick.gov>
Cc: Schnieders, Melissa J. <Melissa.Schnieders@sedgwick.gov>
Subject: (EXTERNAL) RE: Token issue

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Sedgwick County Division of Information and Technology

This has been written up as a defect in Agency Central. It only applies to 'new users' that were created. This should be corrected in 14.6.

Kendra Green | Account Manager, Voter Registration
ESSVR, LLC | 11208 John Galt Blvd. Omaha, NE 68137
O: 800.353.2832 | kendra.green@essvrllc.com

From: Lehman, Tabitha M. <tabitha.lehman@sedgwick.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2020 9:11 AM
To: Green, Kendra <kendra.green@essvrllc.com>
Cc: Schnieders, Melissa J. <Melissa.Schnieders@sedgwick.gov>
Subject: Token issue

Hey Kendra,

We have a new employee who has been working in ELVIS with her token. When I run activity reports and select a specific activity like "Advance status change" her activity shows up. However, when I try to run an activity report on her token, it says there is no activity, at all.

Can you help me with what I am doing wrong here? This is the first time in 11 years I have seen something like this occur.

Her name is Stephanie Garcia and her token id is sgarcia173.

Thanks,
Tabitha Lehman
Sedgwick County Election Commissioner

28

RE: Kansas VoterView Admin

Williams, Victor <victor.williams@essvrllc.com>
Mon 6/22/2020 9:24 AM
To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Bryan,

I will call you this afternoon. I was somewhat off the grid Friday and over the weekend.

Thank you.

Victor Williams
Sr. Vice President - Product Development
O: 402.970.1151 | C: 402.943.6133

From: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Sent: Friday, June 19, 2020 9:29 AM
To: Williams, Victor <victor.williams@essvrllc.com>
Subject: FW: Kansas VoterView Admin
Importance: High

Victor:

When you get a chance would you give me a call today? I would like to discuss this and also a token setting in ELVIS that is troubling to me from a security perspective.

Thanks.

BRYAN A. CASKEY | Director of Elections

Kansas Secretary of State | 785-296-3488 P | 785-581-3623 C | 785-291-3051 F |
Memorial Hall, 1st Floor | 120 S.W. 10th Avenue | Topeka, KS 66612-1594

"Every election is determined by the people who show up."
  • Larry J. Sabato, _Pendulum Swing_
  -

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Good Morning,

Please review the attached VoterView Admin guide (Word and PDF versions).

Left: Page 47:

June 22, 2020,

Bryan Caskey, Dir. Of Elections, asks for a phone call with Victor Williams, Sr. Vice Pres- Product Development of ES&S

Due to apparent security concerns with ELVIS.

No further context provided.

Phone calls are an easy way to avoid KORA detection.

Right: Pages 37:

CIS, the Center for Internet Security, a 3rd Party cyber security company, reported undetected activity by an external employee in ELVIS.

No remedy or additional conclusion provided.

The whitelisted the Source IP, as to not be bothered by it if it were to happen again.

Could mean other outsiders could enter undetected as well…?

RE: KS - SOS - New - Warning Incident 4385874 - Windows WMIC NIC get Microsoft Windows DOS prompt command exit OUTBOUND - MS-ISAC SOC Ticket 4385874

MS-ISAC SOC <SOC@msisac.org>
Sat 7/4/2020 11:59 AM
To: Victor Williams <victor.williams@essvrllc.com>; MS-ISAC SOC <SOC@msisac.org>; Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>; Chris Wlaschin <chris.wlaschin@essvote.com>
Cc: SOC_Supervisor.dl <SOC_Supervisor.dl@cisecurity.org>; ElectionOps <electionops@cisecurity.org>

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Thanks for the info Victor.

We whitelisted the source IP as an internal monitoring system.

Let us know if you would like to close the ticket.

Best regards,

Muhammed Zahid Ayar
Senior Security Operations Center Analyst
Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)
Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC)
31 Tech Valley Drive
East Greenbush, NY 12061

24x7 Security Operations Center
SOC@cisecurity.org - 1-866-787-4722

MS-ISAC®
Multi-State Information
Sharing & Analysis Center®

Elections Infrastructure ISAC

From: Williams, Victor <victor.williams@essvrllc.com>
Sent: Saturday, July 4, 2020 12:49 PM
To: MS-ISAC SOC <SOC@msisac.org>; Bryan Caskey <bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov>; Wlaschin, Chris <chris.wlaschin@essvote.com>
Cc: SOC_Supervisor.dl <SOC_Supervisor.dl@cisecurity.org>; ElectionOps <electionops@cisecurity.org>
Subject: Re: KS - SOS - New - Warning Incident 4385874 - Windows WMIC NIC get Microsoft Windows DOS prompt command exit OUTBOUND - MS-ISAC SOC Ticket 4385874

Left panel (Page 37):

RE: KS - SOS - New - Warning Incident 4385874 - Windows WMIC NIC get Microsoft Windows DOS prompt command exit OUTBOUND - MS-ISAC SOC Ticket 4385874

MS-ISAC SOC <SOC@msisac.org>
Sat 7/4/2020 11:59 AM
To: Victor Williams <victor.williams@essvrllc.com>; MS-ISAC SOC <SOC@msisac.org>; Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>; Chris Wlaschin <chris.wlaschin@essvote.com>
Cc: SOC_Supervisor.dl <SOC_Supervisor.dl@cisecurity.org>; ElectionOps <electionops@cisecurity.org>

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Thanks for the info Victor.

We whitelisted the source IP as an internal monitoring system.

Let us know if you would like to close the ticket.

Best regards,

Muhammed Zahid Ayar
Senior Security Operations Center Analyst
Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)
Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC)
31 Tech Valley Drive
East Greenbush, NY 12061

24x7 Security Operations Center
SOC@cisecurity.org - 1-866-787-4722

MS-ISAC®
Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center®

Elections Infrastructure ISAC

From: Williams, Victor <victor.williams@essvrllc.com>
Sent: Saturday, July 4, 2020 12:49 PM
To: MS-ISAC SOC <SOC@msisac.org>; Bryan Caskey <bryan.caskey@sos.ks.gov>; Wlaschin, Chris <chris.wlaschin@essvote.com>
Cc: SOC_Supervisor.dl <SOC_Supervisor.dl@cisecurity.org>; ElectionOps <electionops@cisecurity.org>
Subject: Re: KS - SOS - New - Warning Incident 4385874 - Windows WMIC NIC get Microsoft Windows DOS prompt command exit OUTBOUND - MS-ISAC SOC Ticket 4385874

Middle panel (Page 38):

This is legitimate traffic from an internal monitoring system. We've recorded this before. Can CIS whitelist this?

Sent from my mobile device.

Victor Williams
Sr. Vice President - Product Development
ES&S / ESSVR
victor.williams@essvrllc.com
O: 402.970.1151 | C: 402.943.6133

From: MS-ISAC SOC <SOC@msisac.org>
Sent: Friday, July 3, 2020 11:47 PM
To: Bryan Caskey; Williams, Victor; Wlaschin, Chris
Cc: SOC_Supervisor.dl; MS-ISAC SOC; ElectionOps
Subject: KS - SOS - New - Warning Incident 4385874 - Windows WMIC NIC get Microsoft Windows DOS prompt command exit OUTBOUND - MS-ISAC SOC Ticket 4385874

Albert Incident #: 4385874
Severity: Warning
MS-ISAC SOC Ticket: 4385874

Description
Windows WMIC NIC get Microsoft Windows DOS prompt command exit OUTBOUND

Analysis
Source IP 10.50.2.164 was logged communicating with destination IP 10.50.6.212 over destination port 61855/TCP. This traffic matched a signature for a WMIC NIC Windows command leaving the network with the string "AdapterType" seen in the stream data. This is being escalated to verify this activity is authorized between these hosts. WMIC can be used for legitimate purposes but may be weaponized by a malicious attacker.

Recommendations
It is recommended to investigate the affected host and remediate appropriately. If activity is authorized, please let us know.

Please do not hesitate to leverage the MS-ISAC to assist you in investigating this incident or in your response and recovery efforts. We perform a variety of incident response services including log analysis, malware analysis, computer forensics, development of a mitigation and recovery strategy as well as network and application vulnerability scanning. Requests for these services can be obtained by calling 1-866-787-4722 or sending an email to SOC@msisac.org.

Supporting Details:
First Seen: 07/04/2020 04:44:24

Albert Observing Devices: ks-sos-Albert-A

Albert History: Initial Albert event notification
Affected Host IP: 10.50.2.164
HIP Info: None
Event Types Observed (Past 30 Days):
Windows WMIC NIC get Microsoft Windows DOS prompt command exit OUTBOUND

Please feel free to contact the MS-ISAC SOC if you have any questions or need additional assistance.

Right panel:

- Left: Page 37, 38, :
- June 4, 2020,
- Muhammed Zahid Ayar, Sr. Security Operations Analyst of the **Center of Internet Security**
- Bryan Caskey, Dir. Of Elections and Victor Williams, Sr. Vice Pres-Product Development of ES&S
- Of a potential unauthorized OUTBOUND activity.
- **Victor of ES&S responds saying that this is legitimate traffic from internal monitoring systems.**
- **Seems to me that this might be the Fox guarding the hen house.**

Center for Internet Security (CIS)
Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)
1-866-787-4722 (7x24 SOC)
Email: soc@cisecurity.org
www.cisecurity.org
Follow us @CISecurity
This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments.

6. KORA File: 20211223081336815.pdf   69 pages
E-mail Communications from 06/11 – 07/27/2020 from Bryan Caskey regarding ES&S

Request to withdraw the EVS 6.0.4.3 release from state certification consideration

Manganaro, Mark <mamanganaro@essvote.com>

Tue 6/16/2020 8:58 AM

To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Mr. Caskey,

Election Systems & Software (ES&S) submitted a request for certification of the EVS 6.0.4.3 release to the Kansas Secretary of State Office on February 20th 2020. This correspondence is to inform the Kansas Secretary of State that ES&S formally withdraws the EVS 6.0.4.3 application submission from certification consideration by your office.

If you have any questions regarding this manner, please do not hesitate to contact me at 402-939-1399 or mamanganaro@essvote.com.

Sincerely,

Mark Manganaro

ESS **Mark Manganaro | State Certification Manager | Election Systems & Software**
11208 John Galt Blvd. Omaha, NE 68137 | O: 402.938.1399
mamanganaro@essvote.com | www.essvote.com

- Left: Page 69

- June 16, 2020,

- Mark Manganaro, State Certification Manager of ES&S

- Sent a notice to Bryan Caskey, KS Election Director

- To inform him that ES&S will not certify the ExpressVote Software, Vers. 6.0.4.3

- It could be that this version was never purchased….?

[County-election-officials] ELVIS Upgrade - IMPORTANT!

county-election-officials-bounces@list.ink.org <county-election-officials-bounces@list.ink.org>
on behalf of
Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Fri 5/8/2020 4:42 PM
To: 'county-election-officials@list.ink.org' <county-election-officials@list.ink.org>

📎 4 attachments (3 MB)
ELVIS Version 14.4.1537 Release Notes.docx; ELVIS Version 14.5 Release Notes.docx; ELVIS Powerlock Information - May 2020.pdf; ATT00001.txt;

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear County Election Officers:

As discussed on the Wednesday conference call, ES&S will install a major upgrade to the ELVIS system this weekend. The system will not be available from 6:00 p.m. CST this evening through Sunday evening.

Attached are the release notes for the upgrade.

There will be two web-ex sessions next week for counties to attend to discuss what is included in the release. The sessions will be identical. The first session will be Tuesday, May 12th, at 10:00 a.m.. The information for the web-ex is here:

For Webex: https://essvote.webex.com/meet/kendra.green

For Audio: USA Toll: +1-650-429-3300 Participant code- 67288057

The second session will be held on Wednesday, May 13th at 1:30 p.m. The information for the web-ex is here:

For Webex: https://essvote.webex.com/meet/kendra.green

For Audio: USA Toll: +1-650-429-3300 Participant code- 67288057

IMPORTANT ELVIS PASSWORD REQUIREMENTS

Beginning Monday when you log-in, new ELVIS password requirements will be implemented. Users will be prompted to update on Monday. Here are some instructions to help:

- Above: Page 60:

- An major ELIVIS Upgrade occurred on May 9 & 10.

From: Green, Kendra <kendra.green@essvrllc.com>
Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2020 3:09 PM
To: Phillips, Kathy, ELC <Kathy.Phillips@jocogov.org>
Cc: Beckner, Jameson [KSOS] (Jameson.Beckner@ks.gov) <Jameson.Beckner@ks.gov>; Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] (Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov) <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>; Cameron, Jeb <jeb.cameron@essvote.com>
Subject: RE: Elvis issues

Correct – that is why we will be writing it up as a defect.

However; it is not a 100% safeguard when it comes to tracking applications because New Advance is NOT accepting an application. It is just adding an ADV flag on a record. It could be a Single, Fixed or Permanent 'flag'.

If you were to go into your own record, click on Advance and hit save. It is going to write activity that that you were a "New Advance" but really, you didn't accept the application or even send yourself an application. (Not a

true representation of logging application returns)

It might be working as you need it too; but really – it is not an accurate way of tracking accepted application. Especially if there are old records that weren't purged correctly.

Kendra Green | Account Manager, Voter Registration
ESSVR, LLC | 11208 John Galt Blvd. Omaha, NE 68137
O: 800.353.2832 | kendra.green@essvrllc.com

From: Green, Kendra <kendra.green@essvrllc.com>
Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2020 2:49 PM
To: Phillips, Kathy, ELC <Kathy.Phillips@jocogov.org>
Cc: Beckner, Jameson [KSOS] (Jameson.Beckner@ks.gov) <Jameson.Beckner@ks.gov>; Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] (Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov) <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>; Cameron, Jeb <jeb.cameron@essvote.com>
Subject: RE: Elvis issues

This message came from outside of Johnson County Government - please use caution when opening attachments or links.

Kathy –

Doing an Activity Viewer for New Advance is not tracking returned applications. It is only tracking that you went into a voter, Clicked Advance, and hit save.

Let me do some digging to see if I can get you a report on how to do a double check on accepted applications. But I would not use Activity Viewer as your go to.

I also am doing to do one more thing in the test environment, but I believe I might be writing this up as a defect.

Kendra Green | Account Manager, Voter Registration
ESSVR, LLC | 11208 John Galt Blvd. Omaha, NE 68137

O: 800.353.2832 | kendra.green@essvrllc.com

From: Phillips, Kathy, ELC <Kathy.Phillips@jocogov.org>
Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2020 1:56 PM
To: Green, Kendra <kendra.green@essvrllc.com>
Cc: Beckner, Jameson [KSOS] (Jameson.Beckner@ks.gov) <Jameson.Beckner@ks.gov>; Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] (Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov) <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Subject: Elvis issues

We are still not able to see activity in Activity Viewer for anyone that has been issued a token since the New Release. We use the Activity Viewer to balance the number of advance applications that person has entered. Right now we are having to run it for all Users then find the number entered for that specific User. Seems strange that we can see their activity if we run by all Users but not by the individual User.

Also, it seems that typing backward has increased since the New Release.

Kathy Phillips
Assistant Election Commissioner / Johnson County, Kansas

- Above & Right: Page 33 & 34:

- ELVIS Issues.

- Acknowledgement of bugs in the ELVIS system.

- This is exceptionally interesting as it is not apparently tracking the activity of certain users in the system.

- ES&S confirmed that they have a "defect".

32

8. KORA File: 20211223081525057.pdf   **72** pages
E-mail Communications from 05/7 – 05/8/2020 from Bryan Caskey regarding ES&S

- The subject docket consists of training schedules, a manual, and election calendar information.

- Nothing concerning sticks out.

9. KORA File: 20211223081608006.pdf   67 pages
E-mail Communications from 05/7 – 05/8/2020 from Bryan Caskey regarding ES&S

- The subject docket is a continuation of 20211223081525057.pdf

- It's a manual…. nothing concerning sticks out.

10. KORA File: 20211223081657816.pdf   64 pages
E-mail Communications from 04/21 - 05/05/2020 from Bryan Caskey regarding ES&S

- The subject file is mostly a manual.

- Of the few e-mails, nothing concerning sticks out.

11. KORA File: 20211223081726636.pdf   35 pages
E-mail Communications from 04/10 – 04/17/2020 from Bryan Caskey regarding ES&S

RE: Outstanding items

Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Fri 4/17/2020 3:57 PM

To: Green, Kendra <kendra.green@essvrllc.com>; Beckner, Jameson [KSOS] <Jameson.Beckner@ks.gov>; Hall, Phill [KSOS] <Phill.Hall@ks.gov>

Cc: Cameron, Jeb <jeb.cameron@essvote.com>

📎 2 attachments (1 MB)
KSSOS - 078.pdf; ELVIS Maintenance Request 34067.pdf;

Kendra:

Thank you for the update. Here is where we stand.

1] Yes. May 9th is an acceptable date to install ELVIS Version 14.5 into the production environment.
2] The answer is **no**. An advance voting mailer is not a list maintenance mailer. Counties are not allowed to adjust any voter registration addresses with the information that is contained on an advance voting application.
3] See attached.
4] See attached.

Let me know if you have other questions or concerns.

Be safe, be well and be blessed!

BRYAN A. CASKEY | Director of Elections

Kansas Secretary of State | 785-296-3488 P | 785-581-3623 C | 785-291-3051 F |
Memorial Hall, 1st Floor | 120 S.W. 10th Avenue | Topeka, KS 66612-1594

"Every election is determined by the people who show up."
- Larry J. Sabato, *Pendulum Swing*

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From: Green, Kendra <kendra.green@essvrllc.com>
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2020 2:39 PM
To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>; Beckner, Jameson [KSOS] <Jameson.Beckner@ks.gov>; Hall, Phill [KSOS] <Phill.Hall@ks.gov>
Cc: Cameron, Jeb <jeb.cameron@essvote.com>
Subject: Outstanding items
Importance: High

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Good afternoon, I am updating our outstanding items:

- We would like to see about taking 14.5 into Production May 9th. We can install the patch into Test/Training during the week one day. Please let me know if this date will work for Production.
- Counties are still waiting to send out ADV applications for their mass mailings. Do we know yet if those will work for their NCOA? Can they be forwardable or non-forwardable?
- I am still waiting on the signed MR for McPherson. They have not proceeded with their NCOA list yet because they ran the Initial. They would like to get this resolved sooner than later so they still have some time to move forward with the rest of their NCOA.
- I have not received the signed CO for the Tokens that we sent out last month.

Kendra Green | Account Manager, Voter Registration
ESSVR, LLC | 11208 John Galt Blvd. Omaha, NE 68137
O: 800.353.2832 | kendra.green@essvrllc.com

From: Green, Kendra
Sent: Monday, April 06, 2020 11:49 AM
To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>; Beckner, Jameson [KSOS] <Jameson.Beckner@ks.gov>; Hall, Phill (Phill.Hall@ks.gov) <Phill.Hall@ks.gov>
Cc: Cameron, Jeb <jeb.cameron@essvote.com>
Subject: a few questions
Importance: High

Good Morning,

I hope you all are staying safe! I have a few items for discussion:

- Counties are wanting to send out mass mailings (EX: advance applications) and want to know if those will work for their NCOA. Can they be forwardable or non-forwardable?

- McPherson ran an initial mailing inadvertently last week. We will be putting a MR together and sent out today to get this corrected.

- Would like to discuss taking 14.5 into production.

Please let me know what time/number works best to discuss these items.

Kendra Green | Account Manager, Voter Registration
ESSVR, LLC | 11208 John Galt Blvd. Omaha, NE 68137
O: 800.353.2832 | kendra.green@essvrllc.com

- Left: Page 5 & 6 :
- April 17, 2020,
- From: Bryan Caskey, Dir. Of Elections
- To: ES&S Staff
- RE, Installation of ELVIS **Ver. 14.5** statewide.

KORA File: 20211223081824991.pdf 76 pages
E-mail Communications from 02/25 – 04/08/2020 from Bryan Caskey regarding ES&S

- The subject File is mainly <u>work from home planning</u>, <u>due to the pandemic.</u>

- Due to the pandemic, <u>numerous access points </u>were created…

ELVIS Discussion

Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>

Fri 3/20/2020 2:27 PM

To: Comstock, Kevin [KSOS] <Kevin.Comstock@ks.gov>; Beckner, Jameson [KSOS] <Jameson.Beckner@ks.gov>; Gunsalus, Catherine [KSOS] <Catherine.Gunsalus@ks.gov>

FYI.

From: Williams, Victor <victor.williams@essvrllc.com>
Sent: Friday, March 20, 2020 2:22 PM
To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Cc: Cameron, Jeb <jeb.cameron@essvote.com>
Subject: RE: Still want to meet today?

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Bryan, in preparation, the following are <u>requirements of accessing ELVIS</u> up for discussion my our perspective:

- Computers should be running Windows 10 in order to access the VR system.
- Computers must have Citrix Receiver version 4.9 installed and running on the system.
- <u>Home internet must</u> be able to access standard SSL port (TCP 443).
- <u>Home connections</u> must not be associated to any blacklists. If any home internet IP addresses are on a blacklist, users will be unable to access the VR system.
- <u>Home IP address must be registered in the USA. IP addresses not registered in the USA will not be able to</u> connect.
- ELVIS will only support TLS1.2 and higher starting on XX/XX/XXXX, and any computer accessing it must support strong security protocols and ciphers.
- Any computer accessing ELVIS should be using anti-virus software that is regularly updated.
- Any person accessing ELVIS will be required to use a DUO two-factor token.

Victor Williams
Sr. Vice President - Product Development
O: 402.970.1151 | C: 402.943.6133

13. KORA File: 20211223081908792.pdf   **71** pages
E-mail Communications from Bryan Caskey regarding ES&S

- The subject file is a continuation of the Power Profile manual.

- Nothing concerning sticks out.

14. KORA File: 20211223082015496.pdf   **71** pages
E-mail Communications from 11/07/2019 – 02/20/2020 from Bryan Caskey regarding ES&S

From: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2020 3:01 PM
To: Manganaro, Mark <mamanganaro@essvote.com>
Cc: Frison, Angie <angie.frison@essvote.com>; Kurland, Christopher <christopher.kurland@essvote.com>
Subject: RE: EVS 6040 follow up

Mark:

See attached.

Thanks.

BRYAN A. CASKEY | Director of Elections

Kansas Secretary of State | 785-296-3488 P | 785-581-3623 C | 785-291-3051 F |
Memorial Hall, 1st Floor | 120 S.W. 10th Avenue | Topeka, KS 66612-1594

"Every election is determined by the people who show up."
  • Larry J. Sabato, _Pendulum Swing_

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From: Manganaro, Mark <mamanganaro@essvote.com>
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 3:34 PM
To: Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Cc: Frison, Angie <angie.frison@essvote.com>; Kurland, Christopher <christopher.kurland@essvote.com>
Subject: RE: EVS 6040 follow up

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Bryan, I never received this certification letter and we have 2 counites (Wyandotte & Trego) that would like to upgrade to 6040. We actually have the SW orders in but cannot process them until we get the official letter. Do you think you can get me a letter today or tomorrow ?

Thanks in advance.

• Left: Page 66

• The subject file is mostly a manual.

• Of the few e-mails, this one sticks out:

• On 1/28/2020, Bryan Caskey SOS, sends a Certification Letter for EVS 6040 to Mark Manganaro of ES&S.

• This was needed to allow counties to upgrade.

EVS 6043

Manganaro, Mark <mamanganaro@essvote.com>
Thu 2/20/2020 4:22 PM
To: Beckner, Jameson [KSOS] <Jameson.Beckner@ks.gov>; Caskey, Bryan [KSOS] <Bryan.Caskey@ks.gov>
Cc: Pearson, Steve <smpearson@essvote.com>

EXTERNAL: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Jameson,
       As we discussed this afternoon I am sending to your attention via UPS (tracking #: 1ZE691811397872016) our formal request for certification of EVS 6.0.4.3 . The submission includes a Technical Data Package (TDP) which includes system operating and maintenance documentation, system security and setup guides as well as a draft of the certification report. We expect to receive certification of the system by the EAC with in two weeks and at that point I can forward to your office the final report and EAC Certification Certificate.
I will give follow up with your office early next week.

If you have any questions or need additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Thanks in advance,

Mark M.

•   Above, Page 65

•   On 2/20/2020, less than a month later, Mark Manganaro of ES&S, is requesting formal certification of EVS Vers: 6.0.4.3.

FROM CITY COUNCIL TO FEDERAL OFFICE, WE DELIVER.

The SeaChange team produces over 17 million optical scan ballots every presidential and mid-term election year to over 3,000 jurisdictions across the upper Midwest and throughout the United States. With our extensive experience in customer support, project implementation, ballot printing, mailing and everything in between, we understand the critical nature of elections.

From: "Carter, Nathan, ELC" <Nathan.Carter@jocogov.org>
Date: July 24, 2020 at 1:33:07 PM CDT
To: "Schmidt, Connie, ELC" <Connie.Schmidt@jocogov.org>, "Sherman, Fred, ELC" <Fred.Sherman@jocogov.org>, "Tyrrel, Debbie, ELC" <Debbie.Tyrrel@jocogov.org>, "Phillips, Kathy, ELC" <Kathy.Phillips@jocogov.org>, "King, Josh, ELC" <Josh.King@jocogov.org>, "Hunt, Zach, ELC" <Zach.Hunt@jocogov.org>
Subject: More Information about 66062 Issue

I received a call from Randy Hite with more information from the Postal Service's internal investigation into the issue with the ballots for 66062. Here are some notes:

- The pallet of ballots for 66062 was sent to Wichita instead of Kansas City, MO. They aren't sure what caused that error. The pallet could have been labeled incorrectly, or an employee could have loaded the pallet on the wrong truck.
- When the pallet arrived in Wichita, they returned it to the Distribution Center in Kansas City, KS instead of the Processing Center in Kansas City, MO. The Distribution Center handles packages, the Processing Center handles letter mail.
- The Distribution Center in Kansas City, KS sent the pallet directly to the local post office in Olathe instead of sending it to the Processing Center in Kansas City, MO. They should have sent it to Kansas City, MO for processing. That's why those ballots weren't scanned.
- The local post office's normal procedure would be to send that mail back to the Processing Center in Kansas City, MO for appropriate processing. However, because they were ballots, they decided to sort the mail themselves to avoid further delivery delays.

So, on the bright side, the ballots ended up where they needed to go despite a couple of wrong turns along the way. That tells me that their workers recognize that ballots need to move quickly. Randy said they would send training information to the various locations involved to help avoid these issues going forward.

Thank you, all.

Nathan Carter
Office Administrator
Johnson County Election Office

SEACHANGE

Logged In: KSJohnson

Track by Mailpiece
Return to Search Results

Mailing Details
Mailing Name	ABF-13242-JohnsonKS
Transaction Id	n/a
Mail Group	JohnsonKS
Mailing Date	7/9/2020
In-Home Delivery Date Range	

Mailpiece Details
Mailpiece ID	28798549212
Name	Douglas Lutz
Address	14536 GRANT ST
VoterID	
User-Defined 2	

Destination Shipment Details
ShipmentId	UT014892509034412926
Drop Facility	55447
Drop Date	7/9/2020
Acceptance Date	No Entry Scan
Piece Count	82,646

Destination IMb Information
Barcode	00721000944039140261
Zip Code	66221252836

Delivery Information
Last Scanned	8/7/2020 7:23:44 PM
Last Scan Facility	64121
USPS Service Standard	3 Days
Historical Average	6.9 Days
Service Std Expected Date	7/13/2020
Historical Avg Expected Date	7/17/2020
Estimated Delivery Date	8/8/2020
Estimated Delivery Days	26

Destination Scans ● Origin Scans ○

Scan Date	Facility	City	State	Operation Code	Operation	Stop the Clock
7/16/2020 5:45:25 PM	64121	KANSAS CITY	MO	918	DBCS/DIOSS BCS DPS- 1ST PASS	Y
7/16/2020 9:59:15 PM	64121	KANSAS CITY	MO	919	DBCS/DIOSS BCS DPS- 2ND PASS	Y
8/6/2020 9:12:48 PM	64121	KANSAS CITY	MO	4	AFCS 200 - CANCELLATIONS	
8/7/2020 11:35:01 AM	64121	KANSAS CITY	MO	894	DBCS/DIOSS BCS INCOMING SCF	
8/7/2020 1:46:29 PM	64121	KANSAS CITY	MO	918	DBCS/DIOSS BCS DPS- 1ST PASS	Y
8/7/2020 7:23:44 PM	64121	KANSAS CITY	MO	919	DBCS/DIOSS BCS DPS- 2ND PASS	Y

SeaChange Print Innovations 14505 27th Ave N, Plymouth, MN 55447
The Track N Trace service uses United States Postal Service® Informed Visibility (IV)® service and the Intelligent Mail® barcode to track automated First-Class™, Standard Mail®, or Periodicals mailings, for better mailing effectiveness and coordinated marketing efforts.

https://www.seachangemn.com/vbm
From the SeaChange Website:

OUR SERVICES
- Designing and printing ballots
- Programming ES&S voting equipment
- Providing testing tools and resources for election administrators
- Training on hardware and software
- Designing and supporting statewide election results reporting
- Designing and supporting county-level election results reporting
- Training election judges online
- Providing vote-by-mail services (absentee ballot and mail balloting)

Left :
- An internal JoCo email explaining how a Pallet of Ballots, bound for Olathe (66062) were never properly processed thru the USPS; they took a short cut.
- This is a failure within the USPS. These must have been advanced ballots.

Above: This is an attachment to the internal e-mail.

Right: This is from the website of SeaChange… Seems like they know a lot about election systems. Are they biased?

As a citizen, I don't like having my ballots being handled by the same people that program the voting machines.

Reference/Supporting Material after this slide

Who is ES&S?

Election commission orders top voting machine vendor to correct misleading claims

This isn't the first time Election Systems & Software has faced accusations of making fabricated or misleading assertions about its voting machines.

A voter in a voting booth. | Steve Helber/AP Photo

By **KIM ZETTER**
08/13/2020 05:00 PM EDT

The federal Election Assistance Commission has rebuked the nation's top voting-machine maker over marketing materials that the panel says deceptively implied the company's voting machines are EAC-certified.

The commission admonished Election Systems & Software over promotional literature and statements on its website that appear to assert, falsely, that voting machines the company sells with embedded modems have been sanctioned by the EAC under its testing and certification program. The statements put ES&S in violation of the EAC's testing and certification rules, the commission wrote in a previously unreported March 20 letter to the company that POLITICO obtained, and directed ES&S to revise the literature and notify customers that the systems are not certified.

POLITICO reported earlier this year that the EAC was looking into the matter but hadn't yet determined whether ES&S had violated its rules.

Some state laws require voting machines used in their jurisdictions to be certified by the EAC. That means that if jurisdictions in those states are using the noncertified systems, it could potentially put election officials in violation of their state law.

"The action by the EAC is welcome, but it's not enough, vendors need to be held accountable for their deceptions and it's time for Congress to exercise oversight of this industry to protect our democracy," said Susan Greenhalgh, senior adviser on election security for Free Speech for People, an election integrity group that brought the issue to the EAC's attention.

The EAC did not respond to a request for comment.

What the dispute is about: The issue involves ES&S' DS200 precinct-based optical-scan machines, which come in two versions — one of which has an optional modem for transmitting results after an election.

The EAC certified the DS200 version without modem capability in 2009, but it has never certified the modem capability that comes with the second version, although the remaining components in that system are certified. In 2011, ES&S submitted a DS200 system with modem and network capability to the EAC for testing and certification, but after the testing lab created a protocol for evaluating this capability, ES&S withdrew those parts of the system from the testing plan; the remainder of the system was tested and certified without them in 2013.

ES&S markets the DS200 as an EAC-certified system, and in literature for the system it offers the modem capability as an optional feature — without indicating that the EAC has not certified this feature. Any component that is not EAC-certified and is added to an EAC-certified system effectively voids the certification of that system.

Under the EAC's testing and certification rules, manufacturers can label a system EAC-certified only if the whole system is certified. "The certification of individual components or modifications shall not be independently represented by a Mark of Certification," the EAC's certification manual says. The rules also require that a company's user manuals "warn purchasers that any changes or modifications to the system not tested and certified by the EAC will void the EAC certification of the voting system."

How this came to light: Lawyers for Free Speech for People and another election integrity group — the National Election Defense Coalition — sent a letter to the EAC in January pointing out misrepresentations in the ES&S literature, as POLITICO reported at the time. POLITICO subsequently reported that the commission had opened a probe into the complaints, and that ES&S had updated one of its advertising brochures to remove references to the modem.

The full **Politico Article** can be found here:
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/13/election-voting-machine-misleading-claims-394891

Election commission orders top voting machine vendor to correct misleading claims

Who is ES&S?

In one example the groups cited, marketing literature for the DS200 with an optional add-on modem is stamped with an "EAC certified" logo. And a diagram the company gave Rhode Island election officials in 2015 shows a DS200 system with an embedded modem among components marked as EAC-certified.

A different ES&S document submitted to Rhode Island states that the "modem transmission of results" is not EAC-certified, nor is the back-end server that receives the transmitted results. But the diagram suggests that the DS200 with modem is certified, while the cellular network the votes traverse after they leave the machine and the server receiving them are not certified.

What the commission found: The EAC agreed with the two election integrity groups and sent ES&S a letter in January indicating it was violating the EAC testing and certification program rules.

ES&S responded that it never meant to imply that the modem capability was certified, and said that regardless of what appears in the literature it always makes clear to states that the modem configuration is not EAC-approved. Nonetheless, the company agreed to remove all references to optional modems from its marketing documents.

But in a followup letter from the EAC on March 20, the commission indicated this was an insufficient remedy. It instructed the company to recall all misleading marketing materials already in circulation and to directly notify current and potential customers who received the "misrepresented information" that it had been inaccurate. It gave the company 15 days to do this.

"Failure to comply will result in the EAC publicly announcing that the voting system no longer complies with its original certification, and could include initiating decertification actions and/or suspension of manufacturer registration," wrote Jerome Lovato, director of the EAC's testing and certification program.

ES&S agreed to send a letter only to customers who use the DS200 with modems, informing them that the version is not EAC-certified, and to post a note to its customer portal advising the same. It indicated that the coronavirus could delay these efforts, though it would make "commercially reasonable efforts" to do this by April 15.

ES&S told POLITICO it sent a letter via email the first week of April to "all applicable modem customers (89 in total)," and posted a notice on its customer portal.

When asked, ES&S did not identify those 89 customers, saying it could not release specific information about customers without their permission. A spokesperson for the Wisconsin Election Commission, whose state is known to use DS200 machines with modems, told POLITICO it did receive the letter from ES&S in early April. Other jurisdictions known to have purchased DS200 systems with modems and contacted by POLITICO did not respond to inquiries.

Key background: This isn't the first time ES&S has faced accusations of making fabricated or misleading assertions about its voting machines. In 2018, the company denied to The New York Times that it had ever installed remote-access software on any of its election management systems. But after being pressed by Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) about the matter, the company admitted it had installed the software on systems in at least 300 election jurisdictions. (The company has refused to identify which jurisdictions had the software.)

Election-management systems are critical components that are used to tally official results and in some cases program voting machines before each election. Remote-access software, which ES&S was using to access those systems over the internet or via modem for troubleshooting, exposed those systems to potential hacking by intruders.

Similarly, the company has long insisted, along with its election customers, that none of its voting systems ever connect to the internet. But researchers found what they believed to be more than three dozen ES&S systems connected to the internet, in a story published last year. Company diagrams showing the configuration of modem-enabled DS200 systems clearly depict the modems transmitting election results over the internet to ES&S election-management systems that also are connected to the internet.

Although ES&S has said the modems are secured and would prevent anyone from using them to hack the voting machines, the modem configurations have never undergone a security assessment by an EAC-approved lab to measure those claims.

ES&S told POLITICO it did obtain a security assessment this year from a Canadian-based security firm called Bulletproof Solutions. An ES&S spokesperson said the firm performed a penetration test of the DS200's communication methods for transmitting election results — a penetration test involves attempts to hack or penetrate a system — and said that Bulletproof was "unable to penetrate any of the systems."

An assessment done by a third-party company, however, is not transparent in the way that assessments done by EAC labs are. The labs follow a published protocol, and their reports are submitted to the EAC. ES&S declined to provide POLITICO with a copy of Bulletproof's security report, saying it's still in draft form and not ready for public release. The company spokesperson said they would have to look into why the company previously withdrew the modem transmission configuration from EAC testing and certification done on the DS200 in 2013.

What's next: ES&S will play a major role in the November election. The company has previously said that more than 33,000 DS200 optical scan machines with modems are in use in 11 states and the District of Columbia but has never identified which jurisdictions this includes beyond D.C.

Dominion & ES&S

- Dominion & ES&S Voting equipment used in the 2020 MI election were found to contain wireless modems.

- The Penrose Report, see page 1 and part of page 4 to the Right and below, can be found in its entirety at the link below. It is Exhibit #6 of an on-going court challenge.

- https://www.depernolaw.com/bailey-documents---april-2021.html

ESS DS200 Machine

The DS200 machine was found to have a wireless 4G modem installed internally within the enclosure of the machine. The printed tapes that summarize the activity during the election show that the 4G modem was used to send the results to a central listener server via secure file transfer. The Telit LE910-SV1 in Figure 5 was found within the ES&S enclosure.

Figure 5

4

April 9, 2021

Analyst: James Thomas Penrose, IV
Report Title: Preliminary Assessment of Wireless Communications Technology for Michigan Voting Systems

Executive Summary

Two versions of Michigan voting systems both Dominion and ESS have been found to have utilized wireless technology. The Dominion Voting Systems proposal for Antrim County shows a quote for wireless transmission capabilities, see Figure 1. Dominion representatives also confirmed issues with wireless transmission of vote totals and even went as far as disabling the saving of ballot images without explicit authorization.

The ESS Model DS200 was found to have an internal wireless card, that has a private network address that was designed to communicate with an ES&S Primary Host Server. These devices and servers are ostensibly designed to operate on a virtual private network (VPN) that does not allow routing to the Internet. While each of the devices do have private network Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, testing revealed that the SIM card used for the DS200 could be utilized in a generic device 4G wireless device and allow for access to the same access point name (APN). There is substantial risk to the ES&S APN connected machines from malicious actors that have access to any SIM card with pre-programmed access to the APN.

The manufacturer of the wireless 4G card used in the ES&S DS200 is a company named Telit. Telit is an internet of things company that has recently taken major investment from a Chinese investment fund that has ties to the Chinese Communist Party according to UK media reporting.

Antrim County Proposal for Wireless Results Transmission

Figure 1

1